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THE FIRST CONGRESS'S UNDERSTANDING OF




Congress's control of federal court jurisdiction has been a favorite topic of debate
for many years.' Commentary on the extent of this legislative power typically has involved
two essentially separate analyses.2 Power over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction has
involved construction of a bafflingly simple phrase in article III of the Constitution
establishing the Court's appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make."' Authority over the lower courts' jurisdiction
turns upon a different provision dealing with "inferior Courts.'' Consistent with the
Madisonian Compromise at the Constitutional Convention,' the latter provision generally
has been considered an appropriate basis for recognizing plenary congressional control
Over the lower courts' jurisdiction. 0
t Copyright CC!) 1986 Boston College Law School.
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.A., 1970, J.D., 1973, University of
Tennessee at Knoxville; J.S.D., 1983, Columbia University.
Most of the scholarly commentary is collected in a mammoth footnote in Clinton, A Mandatory
View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 741, 742-44 n.3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Clinton, Mandatory View}. See also Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36
STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Gunther, Guide].
See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL. SYSTEM 309-74 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER 2d].
3 U.S. CoNsr. art. III, 2.
4 U.S. 0:e:sr. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested ... in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
'The details of the Madisonian Compromise have been presented elsewhere. See, e.g., HART
& WECHSLER 2d, supra note 2, at 11-12. See also Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 763-64.
In response to the Convention's approval of a motion that would have denied the national govern-
ment authority to create lower federal courts, James Madison and James Wilson advanced and the
Convention accepted a compromise plan that would postpone consideration of the issue. Instead
of mandating lower courts, the Constitution would simply empower Congress to decide whether
there should be lower federal courts. 1 NI. FARRAND, THE RECORDS 01."I'HE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, 124-25 (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND'S RECORDS]. See also 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS at 45-46.
6 See Gunther, Guide, supra note 1, at 912-14.
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In recent years, Professor Julius Goebel? and Professor Robert Clinton 8 have chal-
lenged the historical accuracy of the traditional understanding of the Madisonian Com-
promise. The theses of these two scholars, however, are inconsistent with the enactment
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 9 This brief note will consider the system of federal courts
created by the first Congress, giving special emphasis to the private and public papers
of Oliver Ellsworth" and William Paterson," the principal drafters of the Judiciary Act.
These papers, together with the jurisdictional limitations contained in the Act and early
interpretations by the Supreme Court and Attorney General Randolph demonstrate a
general acceptance of extensive congressional control over federal court jurisdiction.
II. THE MANDATORY THESES
Professor Goebel's rejection of the Madisonian Compromise is based upon what
appears to be a simple editorial revision of article III. The Committee of Detail draft of
the Constitution as amended and referred to by the Committee of Style required "such
Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the
Legislature of the United States." 12 During the last few weeks of the Convention, the
Committee of Style rewrote this language to require "such inferior courts as Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."' 8 Professor Goebel concluded that this
change was intended to rescind the Compromise and mandate the creation of a system
of inferior courts vested with the complete judicial power of the United States." If
Professor Goebel's thesis were adopted as constitutional doctrine, Congress would have
no authority to limit the jurisdiction of the lower Federal courts.' 8 This conclusion has
been criticized as "uncharacteristically thinly supported and unpersuasive.""
Professor Clinton presented a more sophisticated thesis. He concluded that the
framers of the Constitution intended a definite linkage between the jurisdictions of the
Supreme Court and the lower courts. Congress can limit any specific federal court's
jurisdiction only so long as the aggregate combined original and appellate jurisdiction
of the federal judiciary encompasses all cases within article III, section 2 of the Consti-
tution.' 7 Under this theory of mandatory aggregate vesting, Congress is free to restrict
7 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, 240-47 (1971).
8 Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 750-54.
9 The judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) [hereinafter cited as Judiciary Act].
1 ° See W. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905) [hereinafter cited as BROWN'S ELL-
SWORTH]; R. LETTIERI, CONNECTICUT'S YOUNG MAN OF THE REVOLUTION: OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1978)
[hereinafter cited as LETTIERI'S ELLSWORTH].
11 See J. O'CONNOR, WILLIAM PATERSON LAWYER AND STATESMAN 1745-1806 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as O'CONNOR'S PATERSON].
' 2 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 575, quoted in J. GOEBEL, .supra note 7, at 246.
15 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 600, quoted in J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 246.
" J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 247.
' 5
 "The discretion left to Congress was the authority to settle the institutional pattern at the
lower level of judicial administration and to arrange how the jurisdiction conferred by section 2 of
Article III was there to be disposed." Id.
18 HART & WECHSLER 2d, supra note 2, at 13 n.46. Most scholars concur in the rejection of
Professor Goebel's analysis. See Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 794 n.169; Redish & Woods, •
Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 61 (1975); Sager, Constitutional Limitations On Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 34 n.47 (1981).
17 The thesis of mandatory aggregate vesting is summarized and resummarized in Clinton,
September 1985]	 FIRST CONGRESS'S UNDERSTANDING	 1103
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts only insofar as the Supreme Court is vested
with appellate jurisdiction over state court adjudications of the excluded cases. Similarly,
Congress may limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to the extent that a lower
federal court is vested with power over the excluded cases.
The thesis of mandatory aggregate vesting has some anomalous policy implications, 18
but the theory is founded in history — not policy. The remainder of the present note
suggests a significant weakness in Professor Clinton's — and incidentally Professor Goe-
bel's — analysis. Although Professor Clinton has meticulously analyzed the records of
the Constitutional Convention and the ratification process for material relevant to
congressional control over federal court jurisdiction, the subsequent enactment of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 receives comparatively cursory consideration.' 9 That Act, however,
deserves more attention because many of the leading participants in the Constitutional
Convention and the subsequent ratification process were members of the first Congress. 26
III. THE JUDICIARY ACT
Oliver Ellsworth and William Paterson were influential delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention, and they later served together in the first Congress and on the Supreme
Court. Ellsworth was a member of the Committee of Detail that prepared the first draft
of the Constitution. 2 ' Paterson is best known for his small states plan that resulted in the
Great Compromise of the Convention: a Senate in which each state has equal represen-
tation. 22 Both men were present when the Madisonian Compromise initially was struck, 23
but they left the Convention before the Committee on Style reported a number of
changes in the last two weeks of the Convention. 24 Nevertheless, they kept in touch with
the political ebb and flow in PhiladelphiaP
Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 749-54 & 841-45. A similar theory is presented in Sager, supra
note 16, at 61-68.
For example, Professor Clinton's analysis seems to recognize a congressional power to limit
the Supreme Court's power to the narrow original jurisdiction in article Ill as long as a system of
lower federal courts is retained. But this absurd suggestion is so unlikely to be implemented that it
cannot be taken as a serious criticism. Professor Clinton suggests, however, that elimination of the
lower courts' diversity jurisdiction might he impermissible unless the Supreme Court is vested with
appellate jurisdiction over state court diversity cases. Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 854
n.369. Elimination of diversity jurisdiction is by no means an absurd proposition. One wonders
about a constitutional theory that would require Congress to create a presumably discretionary
appellate jurisdiction that the Supreme Court certainly would never use,
19 See id. at 846-51.
2" See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (R. Morris 6th ed. 1982); Sager, supra note 16,
at 31 n.37.
21 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 97.
22 See generally C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONTENTION Ch. 10 (1966): O'CONNOR'S PATER-
SON, supra note 11, ch. 7.
2' The Madisonian Compromise was approved initially on June 5 and finally on July 18, 1787.
See HART & WECHSLER 2d, supra note 2, at 11-12. Paterson left the Convention on July 23, 1787.
3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 589. Ellsworth left sometime between August 23 and August
27, 1787. Id. at 487. The Convention concluded its business on September 17, 1787. Id. at 041-50.
21 'The Committee on Style submitted its report on September 12, 1787. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 5, 582. Paterson and Ellsworth left in late July and August. See supra note 23.
" See, e.g., Letter from fellow New Jersey Delegate David Brearley to William Paterson (Aug.
21, 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 73; Letter from William Paterson to
Oliver Ellsworth (Aug. 23, 1787) (inquiring, "What are the Convention about? When will they
1104	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:1101
Although Paterson did not participate in the subsequent ratification process, 2° Ell-
sworth played a significant role in Connecticut. Before the Connecticut ratification
convention was convened, Ellsworth began writing a series of influential essays" entitled,
The Letters of a Landholder. 28
 In Landholder VI, he responded to George Mason's complaint
that the system of federal courts authorized by the Constitution would "absorb and
destroy the judiciaries of the several states." 29
 Ellsworth flatly rejected any notion that
the complete judicial power must be vested in the federal judiciary: "nothing hinders
but ... that all the cases, except the few in which [the Supreme Court] has original and
not appellate jurisdiction, may in the first instance be had in the state courts and those
trials he final except in cases of great magnitude."" Ellsworth's political ally and mentor,9 i
Roger Sherman, voiced this same view in more detail."
rise?"), reprinted in 4 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 73. When the final version of the
Constitution was complete, Paterson returned to Philadelphia and signed the document. 2 FAR-
RAND'S RECORDS, ,511pra DOW 5, at 664.
After the Convention was over, Ellsworth met with Roger Sherman, a fellow Connecticut
delegate, to draft a formal report to Connecticut's Governor Huntington. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 351-52 (M. Jensen ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. The next day, their report was sent to the Governor. Letter from
Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), reprinted in 3
JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 352. Sherman was present throughout the Convention
and signed the proposed Constitution. 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 590. One may
reasonably assume that Ellsworth discussed the business of the Convention on this and other
occasions. For Ellsworth's and Sherman's understanding of congressional power over (he lower
courts' jurisdiction, see infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text,
'2" "There is no indication that Paterson played any role in winning support for the ratification
in New Jersey, but there was no significant opposition to be worried about." O'CoNNoR's PATERSON,
supra note 11, at 161 (footnote omitted). Accord 3 JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra mote 25,
at 117-97 (exhaustive analysis of the ratification process in New Jersey). During this time, Paterson
was successfully staving off financial ruin. His ne'er-do-well brother had listed him as guarantor on
a number of obligations. O'CONNOR'S PATERSON, supra note 11, at 165-68.
27 See 13 JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 562. Rufus King declared that "'the
Landholder' will do more service our way than the elaborate works of Publius [the Federalist
Papers]." Letter from Rufus King to Jeremiah Wadsworth (Dec. 23, 1788), quoted in 13 JENSEN'S
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 562,
28
 Ellsworth, The Letters of a Landholder (Nov. 1787—Mar. 1788), reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OE THE UNITED STATES 135-202 (P. Ford ed. 1892) [hereinafter cited as Landholder;
for convenience, both the letter number and the Ford pagination are indicated]. On Ellsworth's
authorship of these letters, see 13 JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY FicsToRy, supra note 25; at 561-62. See
also ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 137 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
29 Mason, The Objections of the Hon. George Mason, to the Proposed Federal Constitution (1787), in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 329-30 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
"Landholder VI, supra note 28, at 164-65 (emphasis added). James Iredell also wrote a response
to Mason's objection. Iredell explained that, "it is impracticable to define everything [in respect to
the federal courts' jurisdiction]. [Therefore] we must depend upon our future legislature in this
case as well as others." Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, Recommended
by the Late Convention (1788), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 343 (P.
Ford ed. 1888).
See BROWN'S ELLSWORTH, supra note .10, at 47-48 (Ellsworth once stated that he had con-
sciously modeled himself after Sherman). See also LETTIERI'S ELLSWORTH, supra note 10, at 43; F.
MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE. AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1786, 178
(1965) (in the Continental Congress, Ellsworth had been "the alter ego of Roger Sherman").
" The wording of Sherman's analysis is remarkably similar to Ellsworth's and clearly rejects
Professor Clinton's thesis:
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After the Constitution was ratified, Ellsworth and Paterson were selected to represent
their states in the Senate. 33 On April 7, 1789, the day after a quorum first was attained
in the Senate, both men were appointed to the committee designated "to bring in a bill
for organizing the Judiciary of the United States." 34 A senator from each state was
appointed to the committee," presumably because everyone agreed that the creation of
a federal judicial system was important and controversial. Anyone who has drafted a
complex document will understand that the actual drafting of the judiciary bill must —
of necessity — have been accomplished by a comparatively small subgroup." Most of
the committee's work was done by Oliver Ellsworth, William Paterson, and Caleb Strong
of Massachusetts. Ellsworth was the father of the legislation and its moving force. 37
Paterson acted as his principal lieutenant, and Strong played a comparatively minor
support role." Ellsworth and Paterson had been allies in the struggle at the Convention
to assure small states protection in Congress," and both men were ardent federalists. 40
It was thought necessary in order to carry into effect the laws of the Union, to promote
justice, and preserve harmony among the states, to extend the judicial powers of the
United States to the enumerated cases, under such regulations and with such excep-
tions as shall be provided by law, which will doubtless reduce them to cases of such magnitude
and importance as cannot safely be trusted to the final decision of the courts of particular states;
and the constitution does not make it necessary that any inferior tribunals should.be
instituted, but it may be done if found necessary.
Sherman, Observations on the New Federal Constitution (A Citizen of New Haven, II) (Dec. 25, 1788)
(emphasis added), reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 240-41 (P.
Ford ed. 1892). See also Sherman, Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the Federal
Constitution (A Citizen of New Haven, 1) (Dec. 4, 1788), reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 235 (P. Ford ed. 1892). Clinton Rossiter thought that Sherman was one of the
most influential members of the Convention and was "probably the most useful and certainly the
most valuable delegate from Connecticut." C. ROSSITER, supra note 22, at 249.
" Paterson was the overwhelming choice of the New Jersey legislature. O'CONNOR'S PATERSON,
supra note 11, at 168. In Connecticut, Ellsworth was unopposed. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS 28 (G. DenBoer ed. 1984).
34 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 (J. Gales ed. 1789). The standard accounts of the legislative process
leading to the creation of the federal judicial system are Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Warren, New Light],
and J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, ch. XI. See also F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT 4-14 (1928).
35 There was a conscious decision to have each state represented on the committee. 1 Docu-
NIENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 14 (Senate
Journal) (L. DePauw ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DEPAUW'S SENATE JouR.NA4 Half of the
members of the committee also had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention: Oliver Ell-
sworth, William Paterson, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, Richard Bassett of Delaware, and William
Few of Georgia. See 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 586-90.
" On May 11, the committee selected a subcommittee to draft a bill. W. MACLAY, THE JOURNAL
OF WILLIAM MACLAY 29 (C. Beard ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as MACLAY'S DIARY]; Letter from
Caleb Strong to Robert Paine (May 24, 1789) (available at Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston,
Massachusetts). Neither Maclay nor Strong give the subcommittee membership.
" Warren, New Light, supra note 34, at 59-60; J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 459-60. After the
House passed an amended version of the Senate bill, Ellsworth, Paterson and Pierce Butler Were
appointed to a special committee to consider the House amendments. See infra note 42. Analysis of
a hand written draft bill in the National Archives (see infra note 41) indicates that the first nine
sections of the draft were written by Paterson, sections 10-23 by Ellsworth, and section 24 by
Strong. Warren, New Light, supra note 34, at 50.
35 Warren, New Light, supra note 34, at 59-60; J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 459-60. See also supra
note 37.
89 See O'CONNOR'S PATERSON, supra note 11, ch. 7. See also the very warm, informal, and chatty
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On June 12, 1789, about two months after Ellsworth's drafting committee was
formed, a bill was reported to the Senate. 41 After lengthy debate and numerous amend-
ments, the legislation was approved by both houses on September 27 of that year. 42 The
bill is reported by the Senate committee, and the legislation eventually enacted, contained
letter from Paterson to Ellsworth (Aug. 23, 1789), reprinted in 4 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5,
at 73.
4" " From the day when every doubt of the right of the smaller states to an equal vote in the
Senate was quieted, they — so 1 received it from the lips of Madison, and so it appears from the
records — exceeded all others in zeal for granting powers to the general governMent. Ellsworth
became one of its strongest pillars. Paterson was for the rest of his life a federalist of federalists."
2 G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 88 (1882). Accord, BROWN'S
ELLSWORTH, supra note 10, ch. V–V11; O'CONNOR'S PATERSON, Supra note 11, ch. 8, 11 & 12.
41 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 46 ( J. Gales ed. 1789). See also MACLAY'S DIARY, Supra note 36, at 72.
There is a minor dispute regarding the precise wording of the bill that was reported out of
committee on June 12. Professor Warren, through careful investigation, was able to locate a
handwritten copy of the bill in the National Archives and concluded that this relic was the bill
actually reported on June 12. Warren, New Light, supra note 34, at 49-50. Accord, DEPAUW'S SENATE
JOURNAL, supra note 35, at 67 n.34. The handwritten bill is in a collection of papers entitled "A Bill
to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States." National Archives, Senate Files, Sen. 1A-BE
Professor Goebel compared this handwritten bill with the bill printed on June 16 by Thomas
Greenleaf, the Senate printer, and found substantial differences. J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 465-
66. He concluded that the handwritten draft in the National Archives actually is a mature but not
final working draft and that the Greenleaf printed version reflects the language that actually was
reported out of committee on June 12. Id. at 463-66.
Professor Goebel's analysis would seem compelling except that the back of the final page of
the handwritten draft found by Professor Warren has the following endorsement:
1st Sess	 L.	 1st Con
A Bill to establish ye judicial
Courts of the United States
Read June 12, 1789.
? l Monday June 22.
assigned for the 2d reading.
as reported
Page 12 of the handwritten bill (which is the final page in Paterson's handwriting) has a similar
endorsement. Perhaps the handwritten draft was the bill actually reported, but members of the
committee made a few changes between June 12 when the bill was reported and June 16 when
printed copies were available. Except for the Assignee Clause (see infra notes 96-105 and accom-
panying text), none of the judiciary measures discussed in the present article are significantly
different in the two bills.
.° The Senate passed a bill on July 17, 1789. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 50 ( J. Gales ed. 1789). This
Senate bill was referred to the House which passed an amended version on September 17, 1789.
Id. at 894. The House version immediately was referred to the Senate where a three person
committee (Ellsworth, Paterson, and Pierce Butler) reviewed the House amendments. Id. at 80. On
September 19, 1789, Ellsworth recommended that the Senate agree to most of the House amend-
ments, and the Senate passed a resolution endorsing Ellsworth's recommendation. DEPAUW'S SENATE
JOURNAL, supra note 35, at 179. On September 21, 1789, the House agreed without debate to the
Senate resolution, I ANNALS OF CONG. 904 ( J. Gales ed. 1789), and the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House and the Vice President the next day, September 22, 1789. 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF TOE FIRST FEDERAL. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 222-23 (L. DePauw
ed. 1977) (]louse Journal); DEPAUW'S SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 35, at 183-84.
49 A Bill to Establish the judicial Courts of the United States (undated) (printed by Thomas
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a number of substantial limitations upon the subject matter jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts. 44 Because all debates in the first Senate were secret," 5
there is some difficulty in piecing together a complete history of the act." Nevertheless,
the Rutgers University Library at New Brunswick has William Paterson's notes of the
Senate debates (Paterson's Notes) 47 and a manuscript of a speech (Paterson's Speech)"
he wrote for the Senate debates. The New York Public Library's Bancroft Collection
contains additional notes and a working draft of Paterson's Speech..' 9 Legal scholars have
paid little attention to these materials. Paterson's Speech and his notes of the Senate
debates are particularly important because the Judiciary Act originated in the Senate
and he was one of the principal drafters.
A. Paterson's Speech and Notes
The Senate debates began on June 22, 1789. 50 As the first order of business the
Senate agreed that some lower courts should be established."' Senator Lee then moved
"[t]hat the jurisdiction of the Federal courts should be confined to cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." 52 Senator Lee and his allies argued that an extensive system
of lower federal courts was unnecessary and an insult to the state judges- 5' Paterson
jotted down his preliminary thoughts in response to Lee's motion" and then redrafted
his thoUghts into a speech to be delivered the next day. 55
Greenleaf) [hereinafter cited as Committee 15111], reprinted in EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS N. 45657
(published by Readex Microprint Corp.). Although two candidates have been nominated as the
committee's final proposed bill (see supra note 41), the widely available Readex Microprint will be
used in the present article. Readex lists the Committee Bill as a House document, but the bill clearly
is the original Senate bill, Compare MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 86, 87 (section in the first part
of bill providing for affirmation by Quakers is broadened by striking the reference to Quakers),
with Committee Bill, supra, at 4 (ninth unnumbered section: affirmation by Quakers). The microprint
Committee Bill is identical to the original Senate bill now in the New York Public Library.
44 See, e.g., infra notes 71-95, 123-34 and accompanying text (diversity and alienage jurisdic-
tion); infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text (Assignee Clause).	 •
" See J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 444 n.163.
46 MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, gives some insights but generally is not very helpful. Senator
Maclay was an adamant opponent of the Judiciary measure. See Warren, New Light, supra note 34,
at 96-97, 109. Indeed, supporters of the measure consciously kept him in the dark. See MACLAY'S
DIARY, supra note 36, at 97-98.
"See Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C.
48 See Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B.
" See Paterson's Draft Speech, infra Appendix A.
50 1 ANNALS OF CONC.. 47 ( J. Gales ed. 1789). Apparently there bad been some preliminary
discussion on June 12, 1789, See MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 72.
51 MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 83.
52 Id. (quoting Lee's motion). The precise words of Senator Lee's proposed amendment appar-
ently were:
That no subordinate federal jurisdiction be established in any State, other than for
Admiralty or Maritime causes but that federal interference shall be limited to Appeals
only from the State Courts to the supreme federal Court of the U. States.
National Archives, Senate Files, Sen. 1A-131, chit number 28. Since the Supreme Court was not
vested with complete appellate jurisdiction (see infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text), Lee's
motion was inconsistent with any theory of mandatory jurisdiction. In any event, the Senate rejected
the motion and proceeded to enact a judiciary system with a number of significant jurisdictional
limitations.
83 See Paterson's Initial Notes, infra Appendix A, lines 1-23.
84 See id. lines 24-142.
55 See Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B.
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Consistent with the traditional understanding of the Madisonian Compromise, Pa-
terson did not even hint in his speech that the Constitution restricts congressional power
to limit the lower courts' jurisdiction. 5" After sonic obligatory but uninspiring introduc-
tory rhetoric, 57
 he began:
Ever since the Adoption of the ConsC I
have considered federal Courts of subordinate
juriscr.' and detached from state Tribunals as
inevitable.
The Necessity, the Utility, the Policy
of them strikes my Mind in the most forcible Manner. 58
He continued in this prudential vein by advancing cogent reasons of policy for creating
lower federal courts." Paterson's unifying theme was that it is unwise to entrust all
federal matters to state judges dependent upon the individual states. 6°
Later on that same day, Lee's motion to limit the lower courts' jurisdiction to
admiralty cases was defeated. The Senate then considered the composition of the Su-
preme Court."' On the next day, June 24, the Senate debated whether to establish the
unusual system of circuit courts proposed by Ellsworth's committee. 62 The principal topic
of debate was "whether there should be circuit courts or courts of nisi prius." 63 Paterson's
56 Paterson's initial notes include the isolated statement that, "The constr.'. points out a number
of articles, which the federal courts must take up." Paterson's Initial Notes, infra Appendix A, lines
165-67. The origin of this statement is unclear (see infra text following note 174), and there is no
comparable passage in Paterson's Speech. See Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B.
In any event, the statement is fraught with ambiguity. Perhaps the phrase, "a Number of
Articles," refers to substantive provisions of the Constitution rather than the list of cases and
controversies in article III, section 2. Furthermore, the verb "must take up," may be hortatory:
Congress has plenary power over the courts' jurisdiction, but prudential considerations are so
overwhelming that the Congress "must" exercise its discretion in favor of jurisdiction. Even if the
statement represents a theory of mandatory jurisdiction, the cases that "the federal courts must
take up" may be the few cases within the Supreme Court's mandatory original jurisdiction. Cf.
Landholder V1, supra note 28, at 164-65, (Oliver Ellsworth notes the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction as the only mandatory jurisdiction under the Constitution) (see supra note 30 and
accompanying text for quotation).
57 See Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B, lines 1-17.
w Id. lines 17-2!.
39 See infra note 60.
6°
 See, e.g., Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B, lines 68-70 ("However I may value a Man,
yet if he be dependent upon another, 1 should not like to submit to his Decision a Dispute in which
that other is concerned."). See generally id. lines 22-97.
6 MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 86. Paterson's Notes on this portion of the Senate's
consideration are obscure. See Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C, lines 1-14, See infra notes 119-
32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pertinent provisions for Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction.
112 See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 471-80. The circuit courts were three judge courts
consisting of the federal district judge of the state where the court sat and at least one Supreme
Court justice. Judiciary Act, supra note 9, § 4. These courts were given appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from the district courts. Id. §§ 11, 21-22. The circuit courts also were given an important
original jurisdiction. Id. §§ 11-12.
MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 86. To most twentieth century attorneys, nisi prim is a
generic concept, but in the eighteenth century this phrase referred specifically to the manner in
which the three English superior courts of' common law exercised their original jurisdiction. The
courts sat en bane at Westminster to decide all pretrial issues. Individual judges then would go on
circuit to preside over the trial of factual issues at nisi pries in the appropriate venue throughout
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Notes provide the gist of what was said, concentrating on the comparative advantages
of a nisi pills system." Sometime after the nisi prius debates, a third alternative remark-
ably similar to the present original jurisdiction of the federal courts was mentioned:
"Why should not the jurisd° of the Dist' Court be complete & extend to all Cases at Law
and in Equity, with an Appeal, limiting the same." 65 If this third alternative had been
adopted, the district courts would have been the principal federal trial courts, and
presumably neither the circuit courts nor a nisi prius system would have been enacted
for the trial of cases. There is some evidence that the drafting committee previously had
also considered vesting the federal trial courts with "complete" jurisdiction. 66
Paterson's Notes do not suggest the significance or context of the comprehensive
district court proposal. Instead, the notes immediately turn to the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts arid begin by considering the amount in controversy limitation. Paterson
recorded:
If a small sum, it
may involve a Question of Law
of great Importance, and
should be liable to be removed.
Hamblen [sic], his a Cause of 20 s/.
— Sum of 500	 small enough.
• • •
Der but how as to the Pltf.
Concurrent jurisdl.".
The Farmers in the New England
States not worth more than
1,000 Dr. on an Average. 67
Following this consideration of the amount in controversy limitation, the Senate discussed
the types of cases that would be tried by the circuit courts. The principal business of the
federal trial courts would be to adjudicate commercial cases involving "Money. Mei - -
chandize. Land bought and sold.... Where Titles are held under different. States, each
State will endeavor to protect its own Grant. they should be tried in the federal Court." 68
The rest of' Paterson's Notes are given over to the Senate's consideration of the procedure
to be used in the lower federal courts, especially the adoption of equity procedures for'
law cases.'"
England. After a verdict, post-trial issues would be decided, and a judgment would be entered by
the court, en bane, at Westminster. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS' THE ENGLISH LEGAL. Svs - rEm 182-87
(G. Hand & D. Bentley 6th ed. 1977); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 657-59.
61 See Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C, lines 15-51.
65 See id, lines 52-57.
66 Professor Warren notes the existence of an anonymous letter "from a gentleman in New
York to his friend in Virginia" that was written at the time of the drafting process and reports,
"What ... [the circuit] Court ... was to have cognizance of all cases of federal jurisdiction, whether
in law or equity above the value of five hundred dollars." Warren, New Light. supra note 34, at 61.
The letter is reprinted in the State Gazette of North Carolina, July 30,1789.
67 Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C, lines 58-73.
68 See id. lines 74-82.
69 See id. lines 83-172.
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B. Jurisdictional Limitations In The Judiciary Act
Consistent with the traditional understanding of the Madisonian Compromise, Pa-
terson clearly thought that Congress had legislative discretion to limit the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts. He forcefully argued against proposals to limit the District
Courts' jurisdiction to admiralty matters, but his arguments were prudential — not
constitutional. To Paterson, Senator Lee's admiralty proposal simply was unwise; Pater-
son assumed that Congress had discretionary authority over the federal courts' jurisdic-
tion." The bill he helped draft and the Act Congress passed certainly contained major
limitations upon the courts' jurisdiction.
1. Amount in Controversy
From the beginning of the drafting process, Ellsworth's committee apparently
agreed that the non-admiralty civil jurisdiction of the lower courts should be limited to
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded five hundred dollars. 7 ' This limitation
was enacted by Congress:72 Professor Clinton concedes that Congress thereby limited
federal jurisdiction but dismisses the excluded litigation as "cases involving a trivial
federal supremacy interest." 73
The members of the Senate, however, clearly did not consider the five hundred
dollar limitation to be trivial. During the debates and in the specific context of a juris-
dictional amount limitation, the point was made, "If a small Sum, it may involve a
Question of Law of great Importance .... Hambden [sic], his a Cause of 20 s/." 74 The
reference to John Hampden's refusal to pay Charles I's Ship Money tax emphasizes that
this was not a casual theoretical consideration. Although only twenty shillings were
" Based solely upon remarks of William Smith in the House of Representatives, Professor
Clinton asserts "it is reasonably clear that federalist supporters of the Judiciary Act believed that
Congress ... had no discretion to decide whether to invest the federal courts with the entirety of
the judicial power of the United States." Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note I, at 850. Although
Senator Maclay advanced an argument similar to Smith's in the Senate debates (MAcLAY's DIARY,
supra note 36, at 83, 85), neither legislator's analysis is entitled to significant weight. Both men
espoused the notion that concurrent state court jurisdiction of causes within article III is unconsti-
tutional. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 85; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 801 ( J. Gales ed. 1789) (Smith's
speech). This is the argument that Hamilton destroyed in Federalist No. 82 and that was rejected
in numerous ratification conventions. See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity jurisdiction, 41 HARI?,
L. REV. 483, 488 (1928). Furthermore, Congress itself gave the back of its hand to the Smith-Maclay
analysis by enacting the Judiciary Act. Neither Maclay nor Smith had been delegates to the Phila-
delphia Convention, and Maclay did not participate in the Pennsylvania ratification Convention. 3
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 558-59; 2 JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at
326-27 (Pennsylvania ratification). Apparently Smith attended the South Carolina convention, but
there is no indication in Elliot's Debates that he ever said anything. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 339 ( J. Elliot ed. 1836)
[hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
7 ' See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (April 30, 1789), reprinted in F. WHAR-
TON, STA-rt; TRIALS OF THE. UNITED STATES 37-38 n.t (1849). See also Letter From a Gentleman in
New York to his Friend in Virginia (1789), discussed in Warren, New Light, supra note 34, at 61.
72 Judiciary Act, supra note 9, § 11 (original jurisdiction); id. § 12 (removal jurisdiction). See
generally Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement: 44 Proposal to "Up
the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299 (1984).
" Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 850.
74 Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C, lines 58-62. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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involved, the King sued Hampden to recover the amount due," and the litigation became
a test for the King's constitutional authority to rule England without a Parliament." The
common law judges barely sustained the King's position." The closeness of the decision
was a serious political defeat for the King and is generally considered an important
antecedent to the English Civil War." The reference in the Senate debates to the Ship
Money case highlights the Senate's understanding that the five hundred dollar limitation
might exclude cases of major national significance. 79
When the Judiciary Act was passed, the rights of British creditors against American
debtors was a good example of small monetary claims implicating a major issue of
national concern. Payment of these debts had been an important consideration in ne-
gotiating the Definitive Peace Treaty concluding the Revolution." The treaty provided,
"tilt is agreed that Creditors on either Side shall meet with no lawful Impediment to the
.recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts heretofore con-
tracted."81 The state governments' failure to assist in implementing this treaty obligation
was an open scandal." Paterson's Notes contain no reference to this issue, but he,
The proceedings are reported in Rex v. Hampden, 3 Howell's State Trials 826 (Exch. 1637)
(The Case of Ship Money). For a legal analysis of the Ship Money case, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 49-55 (2d ed. 1937); Keir, The Case of Ship Money, 52 L. Q. REV. 546
(1936).
76 "If [Ship Money] could be established as a regular tax which the King was entitled to collect
without Parliamentary consent, the fundamental constitutional issue of the century would be decided
in favor of the Monarchy." C. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 55 (1961). See generally id. at 54-
56; G. AYLMER, 1603-1689: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 82-85 (1963); C. WEDGWOOD,
THE KING'S PEACE Bk 2, ch. II (1955); Keir, supra note 75.
" The vote was 7-5. Rex v. Hampden, 3 Howell's State Trials 826 (Exch. 1637).
78 G. AYLMER, supra note 76, at 84-85; C. HILL, supra note 76, at 55-56.
" The Senate's concern in this regard also is reflected in its subsequent rejection of a House
proposal to add a provision to the Bill of Rights restricting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
to cases in which the amount in controversy is one thousand dollars or higher. See DEPACIA''S SENATE
JOURNAL, supra note 35, at 154 (House proposal rejected by the Senate). Madison explained, ''It will
be impossible I find to prevail on the Senate to concur in the limitation on the value of appeals to
the Supreme Court, which they say is unnecessary, and might be embarrassing in questions of
national or constitutional importance in their principle, tho' of small pecuniary amount." Letter
from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789) (emphasis original), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 418-20 (R. Rutland ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MADISON PAPERS].
See also Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON
PAPERS, supra, at 402-03. Madison's understanding of the Senate's objection to a constitutional
amount in controversy limitation on jurisdiction probably was based upon his discussions with
Ellsworth, Paterson, and Senator Carroll, the Senate managers at the committee of conference on
the proposed Bill of Rights. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 454.
86 See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Aug. 25, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 302-10 (C. Adams ed. 1853). See also S. BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE
AND DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1962); D. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 72-75 (1971).
x1 Treaty of Peace, Art. 4, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS
OF THE. UNITED STATES 151 (H. Miller ed. 1931).
" See I A. DECONDE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 40-41 (3d ed. 1971); D.
HENDERSON, supra note 80, at 74; 4 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 176-79, 190-
93, 370-7I (1926) (Chief Justice Marshall's biography of Washington). During the Pennsylvania
ratification debates, James Wilson lamented, "the truth is, and I am sorry to say it, that in order to
prevent the payment of British debts, and from other causes, our treaties have been violated . .."
2 JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 517. Oliver Ellsworth made the same point in
the Continental Congress and in the Connecticut ratification debates. See Madison's Notes of Debates
in the Continental Congress ( Jan. 16, 1783), reprinted in 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 79, at 46—
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Ellsworth, and the rest of the Senate surely were aware of the problem." Paterson was
counsel for British interests after the Revolution and had the most extensive cleht
collection practice in New Jersey." Ellsworth had specifically referred to the problem of
British debts in the Connecticut ratification ciebates, 8' In particular, a great part of the
aggregate British debt was for individual sums of less than five hundred dollars.""
Therefore the amount in controversy limitation effectively precluded a significant group
of British creditors from having a federal court vindicate rights secured by the most
important treaty in United States history." Congress could not conceivably have viewed
47; 3 JENSENS DocomENTAuv HISTORY, supra note 25, at 544. See also the colloquy between Edmund
Lee and Chief Justice Marshall in Dunlop v. Ball, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 180, 182-83 (1804) (both men
agreed, "The fact was notorious. that [at the time the Judiciary Act was passed] it was the general
opinion of the inhabitants of the state, and of the juries that a British debt could not he recovered").
Notwithstanding Wilson's concern for this problem and the pertinent jurisdictional limitations in
the Judiciary Act, he approved the Act. See MAcLAY's DE/kw.' supra note 36, at 98, 100.
83 There is evidence to suggest that the five hundred dollar amount in controversy limitation
was placed in the Act to deprive specific British creditors of a federal forum. In 1801, there was a
proposal to reduce the jurisdictional amount from $500 to $400. Representative Nicholas, in
opposition to the proposal:
stated that the estate of Lord Fairfax. with quit rents due thereon, had been confiscated
during the Revolution by the State of Virginia; notwithstanding the confiscation, the
heirs of Lord Fairfax had sold all their rights, which the assignees contended remained
unimpaired. It might be their wish to prosecute in a Federal court, expecting to gain
advantages in it which could not be had from the courts of Virginia. His object was
to defeat. the purpose by limiting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts to sums beyond
the amount of quit rents alleged to be due by any individual.
10 ANNALS OF CONC. 897 (1801). Furthermore, ''As most of the business of the British merchants
in Virginia had been of retail nature, dispersed by local factors, a great part of the debts was
composed of separate sums under $500." S. BEMIS, supra note 80, at 436.
The treaty obligation of the United States to British creditors was discussed in the House
debates of the Judiciary Act. Representative Sedgwick forcefully argued:
The United States, after a glorious and successful smuggle, in which they displayed a
valor and patriotism astonishing the Old World, secured their independence! and a
single concession was the price of an honorable peace. The discharge of bona fide debts
due from the citizens of America to the subjects of Britain was all that Britain required,
Now, is it not obvious to every man, that this honorable stipulation ought by all means
to be considered the supreme law of the land?
I ANNALS OF CONG. 806 ( J. Gales ed. 1789). See also id, at 813-14 (Rep. Jackson); id, at 822 (Rep.
Vining).
84 See generally R. Haskett, William Paterson, Counsellor at Law (1952) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton Univ.). During the seven year period 1783-1790, Paterson was counsel in 947 cases in
his four busiest counties. At least 544 of these were debt cases, arid he represented the creditor in
455. O'CONNOR'S PATERSON, supra note 11, at 120-21.
" See supra note 82.
"" Based upon a study of the records of the British Foreign Office, Professor Bemis concluded
that a great part of the British debts involved specific sums below $500 and that technical problems
of proof were major impediments to recovery. S. BE:sus, supra note 80, at 436-37. Accord, C.
RITCHESON, AFTERMATH or REVOLUTION 66-67 (1969) (discussing debts owed to two Glasgow firms);
Evans, Planter Indebtedness and the Corning of the Revolution in Virginia, 19 Wm. & MARI. Q. 511, 518
(3d Ser. 1962).
" In 1802, the Fourth article of the Definitive Treaty of Peace was reaffirmed in the Convention
of Jan. 8, 1802. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, art. II, reprinted in 2 1 -1. MILLER, TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 488 (1931). A group of British
merchants petitioned Congress to remove the live hundred dollar limitation so that the United
States' obligation could he fully implemented. They complained:
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this treaty obligation to Great Britain as unimportant."
Even when viewed strictly in terms of dollars and cents, the five hundred dollar
limitation was significant." The comment. in the Senate debates that, "Whe Farmers in
the New England States [are] not worth more than 1,000 Dr on an Average,""' surely
was proffered as an objection to the limitation. These farmers — and more important
their out-of-state creditors — were effectively denied the protection authorized by the
Constitution's diversity provision.
The five hundred dollar amount in controversy limitation also effectively barred
virtually all common law tort actions from the federal trial courts.'" During the closed
Senate debates, the apparent point was made that the lower courts' jurisdiction would
extend to "Money. Merchandize. Land bought and sold.... Where Titles are held under
different States, each Slate will endeavor to protect its own Grant. they should be tried
in the federal Court." 2 Tort. actions are notably absent from this list. Oliver Ellsworth
understood that the amount in controversy limitation proposed by his committee would
be a significant barrier to tort claims. He had served upon the highest appellate court
in Connecticut for four years and knew that tort judgments in excess of five hundred
dollars were rare. 93 Nevertheless, he proposed and Congress enacted a five hundred
a number of small debts are due from individuals, widely dispersed throughout the
State of Virginia, to British creditors ... and that ... they and their agents are exposed
to much trouble, incur a heavy expense, and frequently with the eventual and entire
loss of debts, supported by such documents and principles as have, in a number of
similar cases. insured them a recovery in the federal circuit court. That ... these [state]
courts do not in practice respect the decisions of the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of the
United States, on the construction of the said fourth article of the British treaty, in relation to
British debts.
Am. STATE PAPERS Misc. 189 (1805) (quoting the petition; emphasis added). In the penultimate
paragraph of the congressional committee's report on the petition, the committee refused to
consider whether the slate courts were properly implementing the treaty obligation. The committee
concluded that the petition should be denied on general principles. Id.
" See, e.g., supra note 83 (Rep. Sedg•ick's reference to the supreme law ()I• the land"). To the
chagrin of our national leaders, the British had seized upon American violations of the treaty's debt
provision as an excuse for failing to comply with other provisions favorable to the United States.
See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786) ("What a misfortune it is,
that Britain should have so well founded a pretext for its palpable infractions!"), reprinted in 3 "I-HE
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY (J. Johnston ed. 1891). See generally F. MARKS,
INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL 5-15 (1973); R. MORRIS, JOHN JAY, THE NATION AND Tull COURT ch. III
(1967). Oliver Ellsworth made the same point at the Connecticut ratification convention. 3 jENSEN'S
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 544.
89 Contemporaneous with the enactment of the Judiciary Act, Congress approved the Bill of
Rights, including the seventh amendment guaranteeing trial by jury in civil cases. See J. GOEBEL,
supra note 7, ch. X. There was a concern, however, not to extend this constitutional right to cases
involving insignificant amounts of money. See id. at 34-35, 450. Accordingly, the right was limited
to cases involving more than twenty dollars (U.S. CONST. amend. VII) a sum far less than five
hundred dollars.
9° Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C, lines 71-73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
9 ' Professor Tachau has studied the federal trial court's docket in Kentucky for the years 1789
to 1816. During that period only live actions for trespass were filed. M. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 158-59 (1978). See also D. HENDERSON, Silpra note 80, at 86 (noting a similar
experience in Virginia).
92 Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C lines 74-82.
°' During the period that Oliver Ellsworth was on the Connecticut bench, there ism.) report of
damages being awarded in excess of $500.00 in a tort case. The largest reported award was $249.75
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dollar limitation. One would assume that those "local Prejudices" 99 that alienage and
diversity jurisdiction were designed to remedy 95 would be particularly virulent in tort
actions.
2. The Assignee Clause
In addition to a general jurisdictional amount in controversy, Ellsworth's committee
proposed and Congress enacted97 a special limitation with respect to promissory notes.
If a note had been assigned, there would be no jurisdiction unless the court would have
had jurisdiction of a suit commenced by the payee. While this Assignee Clause served
to prevent collusive assignments to create diversity jurisdiction, 98
 the clause also had an
undesirable impact upon interstate commerce. As a practical matter, a New York mer-
chant might be reluctant to take a note between two Rhode Islanders because the New
York merchant would have to resort to Rhode Island state courts to collect on the note. 99
involving assault and battery. Wilford v. Grant, 1 Kirby 114, 114 (Conn. 1786). All other judgments
were for less than $100.00. See Barker v. Wilford, 1 Kirby 232, 232 (Conn. 1787) (mentioning
$66.60 judgment in related tort action); Thomson v. Church, 1 Kirby 212, 212 (Conn. 1787) ($0.01);
Kimball v. Munson, 2 Kirby 3, 5 (Conn. 1786) ($36.63); Bill v. Scott, 1 Kirby 62, 62 (Conn. 1786)
($13.32, judgment reversed). During this period, damages were awarded in pounds and shillings.
A New England pound was worth $3.33 in 1789 dollars. F. MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE.
WASHINGTON 83 n.3 (1972).
During the period immediately after Ellsworth left the Connecticut bench, the trend of small
tort judgments continued. See Church v. Dewolf, 2 Root 282, 283 (Conn. 1795) ($29.64); Waters v.
Waterman, 2 Root 214, 214 (Conn. 1795) ($49.95); Allen v. Dyon, 2 Root 213, 213 (Conn. 1795)
($19.98); Lambert v. Parmelee, 2 Root 181, 183 (Conn. 1795) ($66.60); Canday v. Lambert, 2 Root
173, 174 (Conn. 1795) ($19.98 judgment replaced by $1.00 judgment); Adgate v. Stores, 2 Root
160, 161 (Conn. 1794) ($0.83); Burlingham v. Wylee, 2 Root 152, 153 (Conn. 1794) ($49.95);
Granger v. Hancock, 2 Root 88, 88 (Conn. 1794) ($1.67); Kelly v. Riggs, 2 Root 13, 13 (Conn. 1793)
($3.33); Webb v. Fitch, 1 Root 544, 544 (Conn. 1793) ($39.96); Davidson v. Fowler, 1 Root 358,
359 (Conn. 1792) ($33.30); Lewis v. Niles, 1 Root 346, 346 (Conn. 1791) ($29.97); Johnson v.
Stanley, 1 Root 245, 246 (Conn. 1791) ($49.95); Merrils v. Goodwin, 1 Root 209, 209 (Conn. 1790)
($4.99); Dixon v. Pierce, 1 Root 138, 138 (Conn. 1789) ($2.33); Hall v. Hall, 1 Root 120, 120 (Conn.
1789) ($49.95). The only exception was Burrows v. Pixley, 1 Root 362, 362-63 (Conn. 1792), in
which damages of $999.00 were awarded for the total destruction of a prosperous business.
94
 Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B, line 105.
95 See Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1948);
Friendly, supra note 70; Yritema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L.
REV. 869 (1931).
96 Committee Bill, supra note 43, at 5 (eleventh unnumbered section). The Assignee Clause
appears in two separate places in the handwritten draft discovered by Professor Warren. See National
Archives File, Draft Bill at 15 (marginalia beside description of circuit courts' jurisdiction); id. at 29
(miscellaneous section in Eater part of the bill). Both are marked out. There probably was some
indecision about where this clause should go, and the printer finally was directed to insert it in the
section defining the circuit courts' jurisdiction.
97 judiciary Act, supra note 9, § 11, The Senate somewhat narrowed the limitation by excepting
"cases of foreign bills of exchange."
9' See 10 ANNALS Of CONG. 897-99 (1801) (discussing the purpose and desirability of the
• Assignee Clause). During the ratification of the Constitution, the anti-federalists had been concerned
about the collusive creation of diversity jurisdiction. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 70, at 526
(George Mason complains specifically that debts might be assigned collusively). See also J. GOEBEL,
supra note 7, at 475-76.
99 See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 539 (1834); H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Pt. 2, ch. II, § 21 (1836). See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
September 1985]	 FIRST CONGRESS'S UNDERSTANDING
	
1115
One may assume that the first Congress fully understood this problem when the clause
originally was enacted.m This type of case also was excluded from the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction. 10 ' Therefore, the Assignee Clause is quite inconsistent with a
constitutional theory mandating the aggregate vesting of the complete judicial power of
the United States.
The constitutionality of the Assignee Clause was considered during oral argument
in Turner v. Bank of North America.'" The bank's counsel argued that "the judicial power,
is the grant of the constitution; and congress can no more limit, than enlarge the
constitutional grant." 10' Oliver Ellsworth, who was then Chief Justice, replied incredu-
lously:
How far is it meant to carry this argument?
Will it be affirmed, that in every case, to which
the judicial power of the United States extends,
the federal courts may exercise a jurisdiction,
without the intervention of the legislature, to
distribute, and regulate, the power?'° 4
Justice Chase emphatically rejected the notion.'°5
If the original understanding of the Constitution was that the complete judicial
power must be vested, the bank's counsel raised a serious issue. The Judiciary Act
1°° As reported by the drafting committee, the Committee Bill had no exceptions. Committee
Bill, supra note 43, at 5 (eleventh unnumbered section). During the Senate debates, however, the
Assignee Clause was amended to exclude "cases of foreign bills of exchange." Judiciary Act, supra
note 9, § 11. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 495.
In 1801, Congress vested the federal courts with jurisdiction over "all actions, or suits, matters
or things cognizable by the judicial authority of the United States, under and by virtue of the
Constitution thereof." Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. IV, § II, 2 Stat. 89, 92. The Assignee Clause,
however, was retained. Id. § 16. In the congressional debates, the opponents of the Assignee Clause
clearly understood the provision's impact upon interstate commerce: "The effect of the amendment
[to retain the Assignee Clause] would be to shut out from the Federal Courts all persons of this
description, whose claims would be as much affected by local passions and prejudices, as though
they had not been assigned." 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 898 (1801). Apparently someone contended
during the debate that the Constitution required that the federal courts be vested with complete
diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 899. But the record of this aspect of the debate is too scanty to draw
any conclusions.
I'm See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
' 02 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
to, Id. at 10. William Paterson was present, but there is no report of any comments that he may
have made. The Turner case was considered in August Term of 1799. "Cushing and lredell, Justices,
were prevented by indisposition from taking their seats on the bench, during the whole term." See
New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dalt.) 1, I n.e (1799). Therefore Paterson's presence was
necessary in Turner to achieve a quorum. See Judiciary Act, supra note 9, § 1.
1 " Turner, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 10 n.a.
'0 Id. Justice Chase stated:
[1]f congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise: and if
congress has not given the power to us, or to any other court, it still remains at the
legislative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be inex-
pedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every subject, in every
form, which the constitution might warrant.
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Chase's forceful language perhaps should be qualified by the fact that
he had strongly opposed ratification of the Constitution. See Dillard, Samuel Chase, in I THE JUSTICES
OF THE SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, 185-97 (L. Pollack ed. 1969). Nevertheless, his statement is
quite consistent with Ellsworth's rhetorical question. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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provided that neither the lower federal courts nor the Supreme Court had jurisdiction.
At the very least, one would expect a casual aside to the effect that the congressionally
imposed limitation did not implicate any significant federal supremacy interest. Instead
the argument was met with incredulity.
3. General Federal Question Jurisdiction
In retrospect, the most remarkable limitation upon the lower courts' jurisdiction
was the absence of general federal question jurisdiction over civil cases. The Senate
considered granting the district courts "complete [jurisdiction] extend[ing] to all
Cases at Law and in Equity."'" in addition, Professor Warren noted that an anonymous
letter written at the time of the drafting process "from a gentleman in New York to his
friend in Virginia" reported: "That Inferior Courts [referring to the circuit courts] ...
shall take cognizance of all cases of Federal jurisdiction, whether in law or equity above
the value of 500 dollars."'" The bill reported by the committee, however, did not vest
the federal courts with general civil federal question jurisdiction.
Instead, the circuit courts were vested with jurisdiction keyed to the nature of the
parties rather than the nature of the dispute:
[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance ... of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, where the mat ter in dispute exceeds ...
the sum . . . of (500) dollars and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners;
or a foreigner or citizen of another state than that in which the suit is brought,
is a party.'"
This language was enacted with a few changes not pertinent to the presem discussion.w"
Thus, the Senate considered vesting the courts with "complete" jurisdiction but even-
tually decided against a broad grant of general power. In contrast, the federal courts
were given general jurisdiction to try federal crimes."u
The legislative decision not to vest the lower courts with a general federal question
jurisdiction barred at least three important categories of cases from the lower courts.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the lower courts' limited jurisdiction was the
ISO Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C, lines 54-55. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
107 Letter from a Gentleman in New York to his Friend in Virginia (1789), quoted in Warren,
New Light, supra note 34, at 61. The letter is reprinted in the State Gazette of North Carolina, July 30,
1789.
ms Committee Bill, .supra note 43 (eleventh unnumbered section). The blank after "(500) dollars"
presumably was included in case the Senate desired to change the allIOMIL
I "" judiciary Act, supra note 9, § 11, The statute provided, in pertinent pan:
That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance ... of all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds ... the sum ... of
five hundred dollars, and the United States are .plaintiffs, or, petitioners; or an alien
is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen
of another Slate.
Id (emphasis added to indicate changes).
I'" The district courts' jurisdiction extended to "all crimes and offenses that shall be cognizable
under the authority of the United States" with a maximum jurisdiction of' thirty lashes, 100 dollars,
and six months imprisonment, Judiciary Act, supra note 9, § 9. The circuit courts' general criminal
jurisdiction did riot extend the courts' original jurisdiction to the limits of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Act of Feb. 4, 1815, 3 Stat. 195, 198 (removal of state criminal cases against federal officers).
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relegation of the United States, itself, to the state courts. If the United States had a small
civil claim against a citizen, the national government was barred from its own courts."'
The Copyright Act of 1790 112 provides another example of an action arising under
federal law barred from the federal courts. Section 6 of the Act created a ''special action
on the case founded upon this act" to recover damages for copyright infringetnent. 113
Instead of vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction, the Copyright Act simply provided
that the action could be initiated "in any court having cognizance thereol.""' Finally,
the Patent Act of 1790 02 similarly restricted suits for patent infringement to the state
courts.''"
All three of these restrictions on jurisdiction involved important federal interests.
Litigation in which the United States is a plaintiff may implicate a significant federal
supremacy interest even though the actual amount in controversy may he small."'
Similarly, there was and is a clearly perceived federal interest in a uniform national
system of patent and copyright laws."" Nevertheless, Congress decided not to vest the
federal courts with general federal question jurisdiction and thereby relegated the bulk
of this litigation to the state courts.
", The circuit courts' jurisdiction over suits by the United States was subject to the live hundred
dollar auMlInt in controversy limitation. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. The district
courts were given concurrent jurisdiction over suits at common law — but apparently not in equity
— by the United States. This jurisdiction was limited to suits in which the :natter in dispute was
one hundred dollars. Judiciary Act, supra note 9 , § 9. If the dispute was less than one hundred
dollars, the government's case would have to be tried in stale court. This strange loophole was
mentioned in the House debates. 1 ANNALS or Cove. 824 ( J. Gales ed. 1789) (Rep. Stone).
112 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). William Paterson was On the Senate
committee appointed to study the bill that became the Copyright Act. B. BUCBEE, THE GENESIS of
AMERICAN PATENT ANL) COPYRIGHT LAW 199 n.65 (1967).
" Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 6, I Stat. 124, 125-26 (1790).
"o'
"." Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
See HART & VirEctist.r.tt 2d, .supra note 2, at 845. Section 4 of the Patent Act provided that
infringers ".shall forfeit and pay ... damages ... which may be recovered in an action On the case
founded on this act." 1 Stat. at l l I (emphasis added). This forfeiture action arguably fell within
the district courts' exclusivejurisdicrion "of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the
laws of the United States." Judiciary Act, supra note 9, §. 9 (emphasis added). The wool ''forfeiture,''
however, was a term of art referring to the practice of seizing a wrongdoer's property — a practice
com monly used in the enforcement of eighteenth century customs laws. See Cd. Hendry Co. V.
Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 136-53 (1943) (extensive discussion of the eighteenth century concept of
forfeiture). Therefore, the provision in the judiciary Act most likely was intended to encompass
seizures of property. In contrast, the infringement action created by the Patent Act was drafted in
terms that explicitly disavowed the accepted legal meaning of forfeiture. See Patent Act of 1790,
ch. 7, 4, 1 Stat. 104, I I I ("shall forfeit and pay ... damages").
I' ) See .supra notes 74, 79 and accompanying text.
"" See generally B. BUGBEE. SUPra note 112. The framers considered a national system of patent
and copyright law sufficiently important to vest Congress with specific legislative authority in this
area. U.S. Coss•r. art. 1, § 8. See generally Feiting, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause in the
Constitution, 17 GEO. L. J. 109 (1929). President Washington urged Congress to enact. copyright
legislation, noting, "there is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion
of science and literature," I ANNALS OF Coto. 932-34 (J. Gales ed. 1790), and a Senate committee
responded, "Literature and Science are essential to the preservation of a free Constitution: the
measures of Government should, therefore, be calculated to strengthen the confidence that is due
to that important truth." Id. at 935-36.
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4. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction
Professor Clinton's thesis of mandatory aggregate vesting would permit significant
limitations upon the original jurisdiction of the lower Federal courts as long as the
excluded cases are cognizable in a state court with an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. This would assure that the federal courts in the aggregate are vested with the
full judicial power of the United States. But the first Congress understood article III in
a different way. In addition to placing substantial limitations upon the lower federal
courts' original jurisdiction, the first Congress substantially limited the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 restricts the Court's appellate jurisdiction over cases
decided by the state courts to three categories:
I. Where the validity of a treaty, statute, or authority of the United States is
drawn into question and the state court's decision is against their validity." 9
2. Where the validity of a state statute or authority is challenged on the basis
of federal law and the state court's decision is in favor of their validity. 12"
3. Where a state court construes a United States constitution, treaty, statute,
or commission and decides against a title, right, privilege, or exemption
under any of them. 121
It is evident from this delineation of jurisdiction that Congress made no attempt what-
soever to mesh the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction with the limitations on the
lower courts' original jurisdiction. Except for admiralty cases and federal crimes, the
lower courts' jurisdiction was keyed to the parties involved. In contrast, the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over the cases excluded from the lower courts' jurisdiction
was defined in terms of three types of federal questions. If the idea of aggregate vesting
is historically accurate, one would expect Congress to have made some effort to coor-
dinate the federal courts' jurisdictions. No such effort was made.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, cases could arise that clearly fall within the judicial
power of the United States but that were excluded from the combined appellate and
original jurisdiction of the federal courts. Suppose, for example, a state court erroneously
voided a state statute for violation of the federal Constitution. 122 Perhaps this could be
dismissed as a situation not involving a federal supremacy interest, but surely there is at
least an interest in uniformity of decision in respect to the meaning of the Constitution.
Furthermore, what if a Connecticut court were to void a Rhode Island statute as contrary
to the federal Constitution? There is a clear federal supremacy interest in granting the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to referee such a dispute between two states over
the meaning of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Congress denied the Court jurisdiction
in such a case.
A far more significant omission in the Court's appellate jurisdiction relates to the
absence of jurisdiction on the basis of alienage — specifically, the problem of British
creditors. In the Pennsylvania ratification proceedings, James Wilson 123 was adamant
119 Judiciary Act, supra note 9, § 25.
120 id.
L21 Id.
L22 See, e.g., Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). After the Ives decision,
Congress expanded the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to include such cases. See F. FRANK-
FURTER Sr J. LANDIS, supra note 34, at 188-98.
124
 Wilson was one of the most influential members of the Constitutional Convention and is
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about the need for a federal forum to implement the nation's treaty obligations.'" But
Congress vested the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction specifically limited to
state court decisions that either invalidated or misconstrued treaties.' 25 This limitation,
when coupled with the amount in controversy limitation on the lower courts' original
jurisdiction, ignored the very real problem of state courts giving lip service to the treaty
while denying a British creditor's claim on some unrelated legal issue or fact.'" Fur-
thermore, if a state court simply refused to recognize the supremacy of the treaty, 127 the
cost of an appeal to the distant Supreme Court would be prohibitive in cases involving
claims of five hundred dollars or less. The game would not be worth the candle. Congress
could have solved the problem of local prejudice against British creditors by giving
unlimited original jurisdiction to the lower courts.' 28 Despite the important national
interests implicated by the claims of British creditors, Congress declined to create a
federal forum for either the original or appellate adjudication of these claims.
The Supreme Court also was deprived of appellate jurisdiction over diversity cases
coming from the state courts. Just as British creditors with claims of five hundred dollars
or less were deprived of a federal forum, so too were American creditors who sold to
citizens of another state. This want of federal jurisdiction was an impediment to national
development insofar as it discouraged interstate commerce. When President Jefferson
announced in 1801 his plan to reduce the extent of the federal judiciary, 129 the New
York City Chamber of Commerce saw a direct connection between diversity jurisdiction
and interstate commerce:
Perhaps no part of the constitution of the United States has had a more
direct and salutary influence upon the trading interest of these states than
the provisions which respect the judiciary department; owing to the confi-
dence which they are calculated to inspire in commercial dealings as well
between foreigners and citizens as between the Citizens of different States.'"
considered the chief drafter of the judicial article. See G. SEED, JAMES WiLsom ch. 4-6 (1978); C.
SMITH, JAMES WILSON,. FOUNDING FATHER 1742-1798 ch. XV & XVI (1956); see also McCloskey,
Introduction, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1-48 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
124 2 JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 520.
125 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
12 6 Wilson certainly understood this problem when he argued for ratification at the Pennsylvania
convention. See 2 JENSEN'S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 520-21 (discussing state abuses
during the Revolution). See also Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 321,324-26 (1796) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). See infra notes 150-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wiscart. Nevertheless,
Wilson approved the Judiciary Act. See MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 98,100.
127
	
is evidence that the state courts did "not in practice respect the decisions of the ...
Supreme Court of the United States on the construction of the said fourth article of the British
treaty, in relation to British debts." AM. STATE PAPERS Misc. No. 189 (1805).
128 Given original federal jurisdiction, even the problem of prejudiced jurors was not insur-
mountable. During the early years, federal marshalls were known to empanel jurors with an eye to
the jurors' political beliefs. See C. PRINCE, THE. FEDERALISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CIVIL
SERVICE 263-67 (1977); M. DAURER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS 165 (1953). In addition, a special
verdict could be used. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gray, Minute Book at 254-55 (C.C. N.C. 1799) (the
Minute Book for the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina is in the Archives Branch of
.the Atlanta Federal Archives & Records Center), in Which Oliver Ellsworth used a special verdict
in a British creditor case. Judgment subsequently was entered for the British creditor on the basis
of the special verdict. Id. at 263.
' 28 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 11-17 (1801) ( Jefferson's first annual message to the Congress). See
generally G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, ch. V
(1981).
'" Memorial of the New York City Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 11,1801), reprinted in 25 THE
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Undoubtedly, the first Congress also understood the commercial implications of diversity
jurisdiction."' Congress, however, exercised its discretion and totally deprived the fed-
eral courts of original and appellate jurisdiction over diversity cases valued at five
hundred dollars or less.' 32
Finally, the plight of aliens and out-of-state citizens involved in tort actions should
not be ignored. Despite the potential for xenophobia, the doors of the federal trial courts
were virtually closed to this type of litigation.'" Nor was the Supreme Court granted
any appellate jurisdiction to correct state court excesses in these controversies.' 34
In summary, the first Congress's allocation of jurisdiction in the judiciary Act is
inconsistent with the thesis that the Constitution requires the entire judicial power of
the United States to be vested in the aggregate in the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts, No effort was made to mesh the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction with the
legislative limitations imposed upon lower federal court jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
judiciary Act completely denied an original or appellate federal forum for the consid-
eration of a number of cases involving important national interests.
C. Randolph'.s Report
Shortly after the judiciary Act became law, Congress asked Edmund Randolph, the
first Attorney General of the United States, to submit a report and recommendation on
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 545-56 n.4 ((-I. Syreu ecl. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HAMILTON
PAPERS]. Accord Memorial of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce (1801), discussed in L. KERBER,
FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT 150, 157 (Paperback ed. 1980). See also Hamilton, The Examination No. V,
reprinted in 25 HAMILTON PATERS, supra, at 476, 480. In subsequent congressional deliberations,
John Rutledge forcefully argued, "[h]e must be a speculator indeed, and his purse must overflow,
who would buy your Western lands and city lots, if there be no independent tribunals where the
validity of your titles will be confirmed." 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (1802). See also L. KERBER, supra,
at 157. Over a hundred years later, Chief Justice Taft made the same point. See C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 136 (4th ed. 1983) (quoting Taft; "no single element in our
governmental system has done so much to secure capital for ... the West and South"),
"'This analysis is ably developed in Frank, supra note 95, at 22-28. In the Virginia and
Pennsylvania Ratification debates, James Madison, John Marshall, and James Wilson defended
diversity jurisdiction in terms of protecting interstate commerce from local prejudice. 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 70, 534-35, 538 (Madison); id. at 556 (Marshall); 2 JENsEN's DOCUMENTARY
II (STORY, supra note 25, at 519 (Wilson). On the related issue of whether there actually was significant
intersectional prejudice in judicial proceedings, compare Friendly, supra note 70, with Yntema &
Jailin, supra note 95. 'These three articles collect most of the pertinent primary sources. In addition,
we know that. Paterson was apprehensive about intersectional prejudice. In his Senate speech
defending the bill that he had helped to draft, he justified the circuit courts' diversity jurisdiction
on the grounds that "State Tribe keep up local Prejudices, etc." See Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix
B, line 105. The concluding "etc." in Paterson's Speech suggests that local prejudice was a familiar
and commonly understood problem.
' 2 Five hundred dollars was not a trivial amount in 1789. Sec .supra notes 74-95 and accom-
panying text. Nevertheless, there were other interests involved. See Am, STATE PAPERS Misc. No.
189 (1805), in which a congressional committee explained that diversity litigation in federal courts
is comparatively inconvenient for local defendants because of the distance they must travel to the
district court. See also Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 329 (1796) (Ellsworth, CJ.). Therefore
"matters of controversy between citizens of different states, which do not involve a very considerable
interest to the parties, ought not to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States." Id. This seems a proper exercise of legislative discretion even though local interests were
favored over national interests.
'" See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
In See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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matters relative to the administration of justice under the authority of the United
States."'" Randolph was not a member of the first Congress, but he had proposed the
Virginia plan at the Constitutional Convention 136 and had followed the Senate's judiciary
measure as it progressed through Congress.'" On December 31, 1790, a little over a
year after the Judiciary Act's passage, Randolph submitted his report.'" This contem-
porary report by the nation's chief law enforcement officer provides additional evidence
regarding the original understanding of congressional power over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
In the first part of the report, Attorney General Randolph discussed some defects
in the existing Act. Among other things, he was dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction over cases from the state courts. Randolph recognized, "[t]hat the
avenue to the federal courts ought ... to be unobstructed." 139 His solution was to
eliminate federal appellate review of state court judgments and provide a system of
pretrial removal.''" If the parties elected not to try a case in federal court, "to that
election [they] ought to adhere.""' There would he no subsequent appeal to the federal
judiciary. The second part of the report consisted of a proposed new judiciary act that
vested the lower federal courts with complete original jurisdiction keyed to the words of
the Constitution. ' 42 After making this broad grant of jurisdiction, the proposed legislation
placed a number of specific limitations upon the lower courts' jurisdiction.' 43 In addition,
the proposed Act made no provision for appeals of state court judgtnents.' 44 Thus,
2 ANNALS OF CONC. 1719 (1790).
' 36 Although Randolph was an important delegate to the Convention, he refused to sign the
Constitution. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates
(Oct. 10, [787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 123-27 (giving his objections,
including, inter alia, a need for further "limiting and defining the judicial power"). Nevertheless,
he eventually supported ratification, and explained in the Virginia debates that Congress had a
broad authority to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
70, at 572.
' 37 See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (April 12, 1789), reprinted in 12
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 79, at 75-77 (1979); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph
( June 17, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 79, at 229-30; Letter from Edmund
Randolph to James Madison (tune 30, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 79, at
273-74.
1 " ANL STATE PAPERS, Misc. No. 17 (Dec. 31, 1790) [hereinafter cited as Randolph's Report;
for convenience, the American State Papers' pagination will be used]. Congress took no action on
the Report. See , ]. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 542.
13" Randolph's Report, supra note 138, at 23.
140 Id. According to Randolph, removal would be accomplished by means of the common law
writ of certiorari. Randolph twice refers to "removal by certiorari before trial" and concludes by
recommending adoption of federal review "by certiorari." Id. in Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
411 (1799), parties seeking to remove a case from a circuit court to the Supreme Court for trial in
the Supreme Court resorted to a writ of certiorari.
"' Randolph's Report., supra note 138, at 23.
' 42 Id. at 26 (district courts); id. at 29 (circuit courts). The circuit courts' removal jurisdiction
was keyed to their original jurisdiction. Id. at 31. A year and a half earlier, Randolph had recom-
mended to Madison that federal court jurisdiction should be established by enacting the words of
the Constitution. Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison ( June 30, 1789), reprinted in
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 79, at 273-74.
"3 Randolph's Report, supra note 138, at 26-27 (district courts); id. at 29-30 (circuit courts).
The major limitations were ;mount in controversy, an Assignee Clause, and suits against the United
States or an individual state. Id. at 26-30.
144 An obscure provision in the proposed act provided, "The Supreme Court shall have power
to issue ... writs of certiorari to the circuit and the State courts." Id. at 31. Throughout the report,
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Randolph recommended that some cases within the judicial power of the United States
could not be filed in federal court, could not be removed to a federal court, and could
not be appealed to a federal court.
In a note° to the proposed statute, the Attorney General examined the constitu-
tionality of one of his proposed blanket limitations — the jurisdictional amount in
controversy.'" He proposed three separate constitutional bases for limiting the courts'
jurisdiction." 7 His second analysis is readily recognizable as the now traditional argument
of plenary congressional power.
The Supreme Court, though inherent in the Constitution, was to receive the
first motion from Congress; the inferior courts must have slept forever
without the pleasure of Congress. Can the sphere of authority over value be
more enlarged?'"
If the original understanding was that the federal courts must be vested with a complete
jurisdiction, how could Randolph plausibly have advanced the plenary power argument
to a Congress consisting of many of his former fellow delegates to the Convention?'"
Furthermore, Randolph expressly noted that his analysis was not limited to trivial
amounts. In.view of Congress's power to elect not to establish federal courts in the first
instance, Randolph concluded, "Can the sphere of authority over value be more en-
larged?"
D. A Final Conundrum
The case of Wiscart v. DAuchy 15° also casts light on the original understanding of
congressional power over the federal courts' jurisdiction. In Wiscart, the plaintiff in error
sought to challenge the federal circuit court's statement of facts. The Supreme Court
refused on the ground that Congress had not provided appellate jurisdiction to review
factual matters. Chief Justice Ellsworth delivered his opinion in broad, sweeping lan-
guage:
[The [Supreme Court's] appellate jurisdiction is, likewise, qualified; inas-
much as it is given with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the
congress shall make." Here, then, is the ground, and the only ground, on
however, Randolph consistently used the idea of certiorari to describe pretrial removal. See supra
note 140. Therefore, the issuance of writs of certiorari by the Supreme Court must be taken to refer
to cases within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; Randolph's
Report, supra note 138, at 30-31 (recognizing the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction).
Randolph's Report, supra note 138, at 34 n.(6).
"6 Id. at 26 (district courts); id. at 29 (circuit courts). Randolph left the precise amount blank.
,47 First, "Whe Constitution has undertaken to describe only the kind of persons and things
which should have access to the federal courts, not to estimate the value in debate." Randolph's
Report, supra note 138, at 34 n.(6)1. Randolph's final argument was that the Constitution should
not be construed to require the creation of expensive federal courts for the recovery of trifling
sums. Id. at '34 n.(6)3.
1-113 Id.
19 Randolph and others have been accused of revisionism in the Virginia ratification debates.
See Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 806, 808-09. If Randolph's actions are viewed in
isolation, the charge is plausible. See supra note 136. Randolph's analysis in his report to the Congress,
however, is consistent with the position that he took in the Virginia ratification debates, see supra
note 136, and also is consistent with the first Congress' enactment of the judiciary Act.
'" 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
September 1985]
	 FIRST CONGRESS'S UNDERSTANDING 	 1123
which we can sustain an appeal. If congress has provided no rule to regulate
our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule
is provided, we cannot depart from it. The question, therefore, on the
constitutional point of an appellate jurisdiction, is simply, whether congress
has established any rule for regulating its exercises?'"
The Chief Justice then interpreted the judiciary Act as depriving the Court of jurisdic-
tion to review the circuit court's statement of facts.'" Justices Wilson and Paterson' 55
disagreed with Ellsworth. Wilson construed the Judiciary Act to provide for review of
the facts, but he also noted, "[e]ven, indeed, if a positive restriction existed by law, it
would, in my judgment, be superseded by the superior authority of the constitutional
provision."' 54
In deciding Wiscart, neither Ellsworth nor Wilson addressed the theory of mandatory
aggregate vesting. The theory would not have been pertinent becausea federal — rather
than a state — court had made the findings of fact sought to be reviewed. Nevertheless,
the tenor of Ellsworth's opinion suggests that he had never heard of the theory. Ellsworth
used plenary language to describe congressional power over the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction: an act of Congress "is the ground, and the only ground, on which
we can sustain an appeal."'" Wilson's argument that Congress could not restrict the
Court's review of lower federal court judgments is quite inconsistent with the theory of
mandatory aggregate vesting.
Ellsworth's opinion might be dismissed as sloppy writing,' 56 but Wilson's dictum
verges on the inexplicable. Wilson was in attendance at the Constitutional Convention
from almost the beginning to the very end,'" As a member of the Committee of Detail,
he personally drafted the essential outline of article III.'" If the theory of mandatory
aggregate vesting was accepted constitutional coin among the Founders, Wilson surely
would have been aware of the doctrine. Yet his dictum in Wiscart casually rejected the
theory. Perhaps Wilson was being devious; perhaps his memory failed; but perhaps he
had never heard of the doctrine.' 59
15 ' Id. at 327.
152 See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 699-702.
'" Paterson did not give an opinion in Wiscart, but during the very next term of Court, he •
noted, Itlhough 1 was silent on the occasion, 1 concurred in opinion with Judge Wilson upon the
second rule laid down in Wiscart v. D'Auchy." Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
336,337 (1797). Paterson almost certainly was referring to the issue of statutory construction rather
than Wilson's dictum regarding congressional power. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
'" Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 325.	 .
155 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
156 The more likely explanation is that Ellsworth's choice of broad, sweeping language reflected
his understanding of congressional control Over federal court jurisdiction. Accord Landholder VI,
supra note 28 (see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying lext); Turner v. Bank of North America, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799) (see supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text).
157 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 5, at 590,
135 See supra note 123.
155 "Since Wilson sat on the Committee of Detail that was instrumental, as we have seen, in
formulating the judicial article, his views on the question of the constitutional authority of the
Congress to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be lightly dismissed."
Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 846 n.351.
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IV. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
In advancing such a subtle thesis of mandatory jurisdiction, Professor Clinton nec-
essarily assumes the framers of the Constitution were subtle legal thinkers, and indeed
they were. Oliver Ellsworth, William Paterson, and James Wilson were not rude colonial
philosophers who dabbled in Locke and occasionally read Blackstone. They were expe-
rienced, sophisticated attorneys with substantial legal practices, Aggregate vesting would
empower Congress to neuter the federal judiciary by refusing to create lower courts and
restricting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to legal issues. If the framers
sought meaningful constitutional protection for the federal courts' jurisdiction, would
they have agreed to such a plan? This is not a hypothetical loophole. Senator Lee and
his confederates in the House attempted to enact such a scheme.' 6° Ellsworth and
Paterson were practical men who surely would have noticed this loophole in the Consti-
tution,' 6 ' especially Paterson, who "[elver since the Adoption of the Const" [had] ...
considered federal Courts of subordinate Jurisd" ... as inevitable."' 62
The first Judiciary Act was drafted by federalists who presumably wanted to assure
a federal forum for disputes in which national interests were implicated, and this fed-
eralist plan by and large prevailed. Senators who, like Ellsworth and Paterson, desired
a comparatively strong national government undoubtedly agreed that Congress exercised
its discretion wisely. In a few cases, however, the federalists were forced to compromise
and therefore agreed to significant limitations upon the courts' jurisdiction. This easily
can be explained in terms of legislative discretion but is inexplicable in terms of consti-
tutional mandate. 165
160 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. See also Warren, New Light, supra note 34, at 66-
67, 125; J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 494, 504.
161 During the Revolutionary War, Paterson forcefully argued for a pragmatic approach to the
law in New Jersey:
It is a grand fault of all the fine writers on government that they do not distinguish
between theory and practice. It is easy to build up an ingenious system or code of law
which shall appear with singular beauty on paper, but which, however, will vanish the
instant we attempt to put it in use. We may sit in legislation, we may frame laws, we
may have all the wisdom, virtue and sagacity on earth ... yet fruitless will be the
enaction of laws, fruitless will be our utmost efforts, if such laws cannot be carried
into execution.
Paterson's Address to a Conference (March 15, 1777), reprinted in 2 SOMERSET COUNTY HIST. Q. 1,
4 (1913).
Ellsworth also was a pragmatic attorney who believed in attention to detail. See BROWN'S
ELLSWORTH, supra note 10, at 26 n.l. See also Letter from William Vans Murray to John Quincy
Adams (Nov. 7, 1800), quoted in C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 60 (1928).
' 62 Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B, lines 17-20. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
'" Apparently there is no record of any framer or participant in the ratification debates clearly
espousing the thesis of mandatory aggregate vesting. Hamilton's Federalist Nos. 81 and 82 are
advanced as clearly but implicitly adopting the thesis. See Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at
832-37. In neither of these papers, however, did Hamilton purport to address Congress' authority
over the federal courts' jurisdiction. Since Hamilton did not present Federalist Nos. 81 and 82 as
his analysis of Congress' authority over the federal courts' jurisdiction, his arguments easily can be
read as a defense of a Constitutional scheme that authorizes but does not require a complete vesting
of the judicial power of the United States. Hamilton did discuss legislative authority over jurisdiction
in the concluding paragraph of Federalist No. 80 and seems to have adopted a plenary power
analysis. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 541 (A. Hamilton) ( J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 552 (A. Hamilton) ( J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Aside from Hamilton, the strange and obscure musings of one Alexander Contee Hanson are
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The limitations enacted by the first Congress cannot be dismissed as trivial and not
involving a federal "supremacy interest." To reconcile these limitations with a theory of
mandatory vesting, one must assume that some of the heads of jurisdiction in the
Constitution are mandatory but others — most notably diversity and alienage jurisdiction
— are not. Article III does not suggest this hierarchy, nor has any historical evidence
been adduced to support such a constitutional doctrine. This notion of a federal su-
premacy interest shaping the Judiciary Act's jurisdiction provisions is appealing and
probably accurate. But surely the supremacy interest was a prudential consideration
guiding Congress's exercise of discretion rather than a mandatory constitutional con-
straint upon congressional authority.
In the first Congress of the United States, fifty-four members had been delegates
to the Constitutional Convention or their state ratification conventions, and all but seven
had advocated ratification. 164 This same Congress immediately proceeded to place a
variety of significant limitations upon the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Judiciary
Act was drafted by sophisticated lawyers who had been leading delegates at the Conven-
tion and who were to become Supreme Court justices. Does it really make sense that
William Paterson and Oliver Ellsworth' 65 did not understand the compromise that had
been struck in Philadelphia? If they were in the dark, so was James Wilson. 1 €6 Edmund
Randolph 167 and James Madison also appear to have assumed that Congress had
discretion to limit the federal courts' aggregate jurisdiction. When John Marshall force-
fully argued for ratification in Virginia, we are told by Professor'Clinton that he did not
understand the plan of the proposed Constitution. 169 Is it plausible to assume that these
noted and rejected. Hanson thought article III mandated the creation of inferior courts, Clinton,
Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 822 n.270. In Congress, Senator Maclay and Representative Smith
erroneously suggested that lower federal courts were required by the Constitution. See supra note
70. This specious analysis was based upon the assumption that the Constitution precluded state
courts from trying cases within article III, section 2. Thus Maclay and Smith rejected the mandatory
aggregate vesting thesis. Indeed, Smith raised the idea in response to a suggestion that state courts
could try federal cases with eventual review by the national Supreme Court. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
798 (J. Gales ed. 1789),
164 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMF.RICAN HISTORY 145 (R. Morris 6th ed. 1982).
• 165 Professor Clinton attacks Ellsworth's opinion in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, see supra notes 150-59
and accompanying text, cm the basis that Ellsworth left the Convention prior to the August 27,
1789, consideration of the judicial article. Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 846, n.351.
Professor Clinton's implicit assumption is that Ellsworth never again discussed the work of the
Convention with any of the other delegates. Surely the more reasonable assumption is that intelligent
and capable individuals interested in the proper governance of their country communicate with
their colleagues. See supra note 25. We know that Paterson did. Id.
16' See supra notes 82, 126. See also supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
' 67 See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
168 Madison spoke in favor of the bill during the course of the House debate. 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 812-13 (J. Gales ed. 1789). At the conclusion of the House debate, lie gave the measure a
general endorsement and voted for it. Gazette of the United States, Sept. 19, 1789, at 3, col. 2.
Although Madison was not entirely pleased with the bill, his correspondence does not suggest that
he thought the measure was unconstitutional. See Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston
( July 31, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 79, at 320-21; Letter from James
Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 79, at
402-03.
169 Clinton, Mandatory View, supra note 1, at 897-48 ("the uninformed views of Chief Justice
Marshall"). See also id. at 778, 806, 809-10, 845. Marshall thought Congress had broad legislative
discretion to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, but he never suggested that any limitation
would require a corresponding expansion of the lower courts' jurisdiction. See Durousseau v. United
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individuals did not understand the Constitution? Alternatively, one might argue that the
first Congress engaged in a vast conspiracy of silence. But the notion that the members
knew that the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional and nevertheless decided upon a course
of lawlessness to further expedient political interests is equally implausible.
The enactment of the judiciary Act of 1789, the House and Senate debates, and
the papers of the participants simply cannot be reconciled with any historical thesis that
the Constitution requires the federal courts to be vested with the complete judicial power
of the United States as defined in article III, section 2. The pertinent historical evidence
indicates that the framers understood the Constitution to grant Congress extensive
legislative discretion over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 1° As a matter of consti-
tutional policy, some degree of discretion to adjust the courts' jurisdiction is essential in
order to fashion a workable system. History — with perhaps a few notable exceptions
— has vindicated the framers' faith in the legislative branch.
States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 313-15, 318 (1810); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159,
172-73 (1805). See also Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution III, reprinted in, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE
or McCuLLocri v. MARYLAND 173 (G. Gunther ed. 1969). Paterson was present when the More case
was decided and apparently concurred in the Chief justice's opinion. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 159 n.a.
In Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212 (1803), the Marshall Court considered an appeal
front the Northwest Territory General Court. See generally Wunder, Constitutional Oversight: Clarke
v. Bazadone and the Territorial Supreme Court as the Court of Last Resort, in 4 - IHE OLD NORTHWEST 259
(1978). In a brief per curiam decision, the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that Congress
had failed to authorize appeals from the territory courts to the Supreme Court. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 214. Since the territory courts were not article III courts, the Clarke decision is a sweeping
rejection of the theory of aggregate vesting. The district and circuit courts could not try civil actions
against residents of the Northwest Territory. judiciary Act, supra note 9, 11. Therefore, Congress
completely failed to vest the judicial power of the United States in respect to these cases.
' 7° This note has addressed constitutional theories requiring the complete vesting of the judicial
power of the United States. Although the Judiciary Act is inconsistent with these theories, it does
not necessarily follow that Congress has plenary authority to diminish the federal courts' jurisdiction.
Other constitutional theories have been advanced to limit congressional power without mandating
a complete vesting of the judicial power. See generally Gunther, Guide, supra note I. These other
theories have not been addressed in this note.
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APPENDIX A
Paterson's Notes of the Initial Senate Debates
and His Preliminary Draft of a Speech.
This document is a handwritten copy of William Paterson's initial notes written
during the first day of the closed Senate consideration of the proposed Judiciary Act.
The copy was made during the nineteenth century and now is in the New York Public
Library's Bancroft Collection."' The original notes were written on four pages, and the
Bancroft transcript introduces the beginning of each original page with a bracketed
lower case letter. The length and narrowness of each page of the Bancroft transcript
indicates that the original notes were written two columns to a page.'"
The document consists of three implicit sections. The first section comprises lines
1-23 and apparently contains Paterson's notes of the arguments advanced by Senators
Lee and Grayson in support of their proposed amendment to restrict the inferior federal
courts' original jurisdiction to Admiralty cases."s The second section comprises lines 24-
142. This is a preliminary draft of or notes for the speech that Paterson delivered the
next day in opposition to the proposed amendment.' The final section begins with line
143.These are either Paterson's random ideas that he decided not to incorporate in the
final draft of his speech or his notes of points made by other Senators during the initial
debates.
The Initial Notes in this Appendix A almost certainly were written on June 22,
1789, the first clay of the Senate debates. We know that on that day Senator Lee submitted
an amendment to confine the lower courts' jurisdiction to admiralty and maritime
matters."' Professor Goebel notes that Lee was charged with proposing this amendment
to the Act because the Virginia Convention that previously had ratified the Constitution
proposed such a limit on the inferior courts." 6 Consistent with this idea, Paterson's notes
begin, "The amendm! proposed by the Convention of Virginia." Senator Maclay noted
in his diary that "Mr. Lee brought forward a motion nearly in the words of the Virginia
Amendment.""7 Senator Lee's amendment was debated on June 22 and again on June
23 when it was rejected."" Paterson's final draft of his speech based upon the preliminary
draft in the second section of the notes twice refers to Senate debate that had taken
place "yesterday." 179 Thus the subject matter of the notes and the fact that the matter
under discussion spanned two days indicates that they cover the Senate's consideration
of Senator Lee's June 22 amendment.
George Bancroft thought, and Professor Goebel uncritically adopted Bancroft's
assumption,'"'' that these notes are "Notes apparently of the debate in the Senate of 8.
171 300 Bancroft Collection 367-83 (available from Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, the
New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and	 Foundation).
172 This is the format that Paterson used in his subsequent notes of the Senate debates. See
Paterson's Notes, infra Appendix C.
'" See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
171 Paterson's Speech is reprinted infra, Appendix B. A comparison of the initial notes in
Appendix A with the final draft in Appendix B clearly demonstrates the relationship between the
two documents.
' 75 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
' 71 .1. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 494 n.105.
177 MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 83.
'" See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
' 79 Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B, lines 8,22.
, H" J GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 494 n.105.
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September 1789." 181
 On that date the Senate was considering the proposed Bill of
Rights,'" and a motion was made and rejected to limit inferior courts to Admiralty
jurisdiction. 1 " The Bancroft thesis is implausible because we know that Paterson's notes
cover a proposal that was the subject of two consecutive days of Senate debate. The
September 8 motion was made and rejected on the same clay.' 84
 Furthermore, Paterson's
speech clearly indicates that he was defending the proposed bill — not the Constitution.
If the constitutional existence of the inferior courts had been in jeopardy, Paterson
surely would have defended the wisdom of Article III at some point during his detailed
speech. He did not. 185 In contrast to Bancroft's thesis, Paterson's notes neatly fit the
Senate's June 22-23 consideration of the proposed Judiciary Act.
Paterson's Initial Notes of the Senate debates and his preliminary draft of a Speech
follow:
[a.]
[Notes apparently of the debate in the Senate of 8. September 1789. See A Hist. of
Cong. during first term of Washington's Administration. pp. 164,166. from original in
handwriting of W m Paterson in the possession of Wm Paterson of Perth Amboy, New
Jersey.]
[In support of Senator Lee's motion]
The amendm! proposed by the
2. Convention of Virginia — that there shall
3. be no subordinate federal Courts ex-
4. cept Admiralty.
5. 1. A Stigma upon State Courts; that
6. they will not do what is right– Etc.
7. 2. There may be an Appeal from
8. the State Courts to the federal-
9. 3. Circuit-Courts cannot pervade
10. so extensive a Country, as this. The
11. Idea taken from the Mother-Country-
12. How then as to appeals-
13. England– Scotland-
14. Nisi Prins Courts,
15. Mass of people if corrupt
16. no Laws can effect-
17. They operate on the same Objects-
18. 2 Supreme Legislatures,
19. omnipotent-
20. No Proof that the Debt is
21. due–
' 8 ' See Bancroft's bracketed introductory continents to the initial notes.
1" DEPAUW'S SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 35. at 160-64.
,"Id. at 163-64.
Id. The Senate Journal's coverage of the Senate's action on the Bill of Rights is uncharac-
teristically detailed. The Senate's actions are reported article by article and the precise wording of
proposed amendments are included. There is no indication that the Senate considered the inferior
courts' jurisdiction on either the day before or the clay after.
1 H 5 See. Paterson's Speech, infra Appendix B.
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22. No Time to study-
23. Abolition of State Leg!'-
[Paterson's preliminary draft of his speech]
24. Objects different-
25. Self-Preservation- As to Crimes-
26. as to Revenue-Judges annually appointed- Sheriffs- reps.
27. Why Admiralty Juris t"
28. When & how are the Facts to be
29. tried-
30. How as to Appeals-
31. Bring Law Home- meet every
32. Citizen in his own State- not drag
33. him 800 miles upon an appeal-
34. The silent operation of Law- or by Force-
35. An appeal from Scotland to England--
36. No appeal in criminal Cases- Sup.
37. Court cannot go into each State-
38. The Necessity- Utility- Policy of
[b.]
39. federal Courts- they grow out of the
40. Nature of the Thing-
4i.	 A number of Republics confederated.
42. Why call upon other Tribunals-
43. Clashing of Jurise- will destroy
44. their Respectability-
45. Uniformity of Decision.
46. A Beauty- if the Bill presents-
47. I consider federal Courts as in-
48. evitable- the Necessity.
49. Who are we-
50. United we have a Head- separated
51. we have a Head, each operating upon
52. different Objects-
53. When we act in Union-
54. The States in their federal Capacity have
55. an Ex- have a Leg- and who shall
56. adjudicate- Judges chosen by the Union-
57. no- Judges &c. They legislate upon dif-
58. ferent objects, their [sic] should be other Judges
59. to decide upon them- It grows up out
60. of the very Nature of the Thing.
61. The State Tribunals consist, &c.
62. The Union has no Vote in their Election,
63. &c.
64. Consider how appointed- some
65. annually, &c.
66. Their Salary- how paid-
67. They become your Judges- fixed upon
68..	 you (luting good Behaviour- entitled to
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69.	 a permanent Salary- and therefore
7{).	 if the State refuses to elect them the year
71. following, the Union will be saddled
72. with the Expense of 3 or 4 Judges in a
73. State instead of one- Or if your Judges
74. no longer than they are State Judges •
75. then you make them entirely dependent
76. upon the State. Is this an eligible
77. Situation-
78. Ap. of casting a Stigma, &c. fear
79. their Virtue-
80. We have as men individually our
81. Interests, &c. So as to States-
82. Shall we suffer Men so situated to
[c.]
83. mingle in our federal Adm'!-
84. Their Interests-
85. I. Different objects- therefore
86. different Tribunals-
87. 2. Situation of the State Judicatures-
88. Again- Consider over what the
89. Dist. Court is to exercise Juriscr.
90. 1.Adm! 2. Crimes of a certain
91. Grade. 3. Revenue-
92. The first conceded.
93. 2. as to Crimes - an axiom, that
94. every Count ought to have within itself
95. & to retain in its own Hands the Powers
96. of self preservation.
97. Offenses will arise, &c.•-- your Existence
98. depends upon their Punishment if corn-
99. mitred, will you put it in the Power
100. of Si. to decide upon them- &c- you
101. put your Life in their Hands- you
102. present with a Sword to destroy yourself-
103. No Appeal.
104. 3. Revenue- Do not give up
105. the Power of collecting your own Revenue-
106. you will collect Nothing- The State
107. Officers will feel it their Interest to con-
108. suit the Temper of the People of the
109. State in which they live rather than
110. that of the Union-
111. 4. Become one People. We must
112. have Tribunals of our own pervading
113. every State, operating upon every Object
114. of a national kind.
115. Hence Uniformity of Decision-
116. Hence we shall approximate to
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117. each other gradually-
118. Hence we shall be assimilated in
119. Manner, in Laws, in Customs-
120. Local Prejudices will he removed-
121. State Passions & Views will he done
122. away- the Mind expands- it will
123. embrace the Union; we shall think
124. and feel, & act as one People-
125. Cire Courts- Mistaken Notions of
126. them- Not in the Nature of Nisi Prius..
127. Courts of Orig! jurisd".- you carry Law
128. to their Homes, to their very Doors-
129. meets every Citizen in his own State-
130. Not many appeals- if q`.1 intricate,
131. adj`.1 till next Term & take the Opinion
132. of the Judges. Appeals from the State
133. Tribunals- monstrous- you make
134. them expensive & oppressive.
135. Cie. Courts cannot pervade the
136. Country- too extensive. Silent operation
137. of Laws.
138. The Laws should be more wisely
139. framed- judiciously expounded, &
140. vigorously executed in Republics
141. than in Monarchies.
142. England- Scotland-
[Miscellaneous notes]
143. Two omnipotent Bodies-
144. Aversion of People to
145. strange Judicatures-
146. Pope's authority; &
147. King's.
148. England. Scotland-
149. An appeal from Scotland
150. to England-
151. Some Courts are appointed
152. by the People- limited
153. by Age- some during
154. Pleasure-
155. Cannot compel them
156. to act- or to become
157. our officers-
158. How as to Jayls- what
159. Power over Sheriffs-
160. Gov. of Laws.
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161. When a Crime is created,
162. who shall have Juriscl of it-
163. you must enlarge the Jurisdr.'
164. of a State Court.
165. The Const'.' points out a
166. Number of Articles, which the federal
167. Courts must take up.
168. The objects are not different-
169. they legislate upon Persons and Things-
170. Corporations shew the actual
17 I.	 Existence of distinct Jurisd"!
172. The Const? has made the Judges
173. of the several States the judges of the
174. Union; because they have taken an
175. Oath to observe the Const':
176. This proves too much-
177. instance the State Legislatures.
178. The Oath is in Nature of an
179. Oath of Allegiance, and not an
180. Oath of Office—
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APPENDIX B
Paterson's Speech
This speech was written for the Senate debates on June 23, 1789 in opposition to
Senator Lee's motion to restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior courts.'"" The speech was
written front and back on a single folded sheet of paper about twice legal size. The
original manuscript is in the Rutgers University Library at New Brunswick.'"
The speech follows:
1. The Proposition now before the House has
2. undergone a very able Discussion. It involves
3. Questions of Magnitude. and no Doubt will receive
4. the most dispassionate Investigation. What objects
5. shall the jurisd'.' of your Dist. Court embrace. What
6. Q? of power shall be attached to it. This is the
7. Q'.' & it is proper to consider it with a critical
8. Eye. Gen'.' Yesterday took a large Field. they
9. viewed the whole System. they took it in .
10. Connection. this perhaps was right. A Beauty
11. frequently results from a View of the Whole which is
lost when garbled, or taken by Piecemeal. If the
13. Bill presents a System properly founded, the more
14. thoroughly it is examined the brighter it will
15. appear; it will please. if bad, if radically
16. defective, the sooner it tumbles to the Ground the
17. better. Ever since the Adoption of the Conse.'
18. have considered federal Courts of subordinate
19. Jurisd': and detached from state Tribunals as
20. inevitable.
20a.	 The Necessity, the Utility, the Policy
21. of them strikes my Mind in the most forcible Manner.
22. The arguments made use of Yesterday might carry
23. Conviction. Who are we. how compounded. of what
24. Materials do we consist. We arc a Combination of
25. Republics. a Number of' free States confederated
26. together, & forming a Social League. United we have
27. a Head. separately we have a Head. each operating
28. upon different Objects. When we act as a Union we
29. move in one Sphere when we act in our individual
30. Capacity we move in another. Totally different &
31. altogether detached from each other. God grant they
32. may remain so. Contemplate the states in their
33. federal Capacity. They have an Executive. They
34. have a Legislature consisting of two Houses to frame
35. Laws for the Weal and Salvation of the Union. and
36. who are to adjudicate upon these Laws. judges
37. chosen by the Union. No. A new Era indeed. Judges
18' See Paterson's Initial Notes, supra Appendix A, notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
187 Paterson Papers, file 4, Rutgers University Library. The New York Public Library's Bancroft
Collection has a transcript of the speech. 300 Bancroft Collection 387-97.
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38. chosen by the respective States; in whose election
39. the Union has no Voice and over whom they have
40. little or no Control. This is a Solecism in
41. Politics. A Novelty in Govt.. The State Tribunals
42. consist of Judges elected by the States in their
43. separate Capacity to decide upon State Laws and
44. State Objects. They are not elected to decide upon
45. National Objects or Laws except as they may come in
46. incidentally in a Cause. The Union has no Vote in
47. their Election, no Voice in their Appointment. They
48. are Strangers. Creatures of the State. dependent
49. upon the State for their Subsistence.
50. Consider how appointed. In some states
51. annually. in some States for a Term of Years. in
52. some during good Behavior. In most they depend for
53. their Salary upon the Leg'. from Year to Year. It is
54. reducible to this Dilemma. either they become your
55. Judges & so forced upon you during good Behavior &
56. entitled to a permanent Salary, and therefore if the
57. State refuses to choose them the Year following, the
58. Union will be saddled with the Expense of both of
59. them in a State because they are they have become
60. your Judges. or if your Judges no longer than they
61. are state Judges Then you make entirely dependent
62. upon the State. Is this an eligible Situation.
63. It is said that it has the Ap. of casting a
64. Stigma upon State Courts; that you fear their
65. Virtue. that they will not do what is right. I do
66. think it should be viewed in that Light. It is a
67. proper Precaution ag! dependent Men.
68. However I may value a Man, yet if he be dependent
69. upon another, 1 should not like to submit to his
70. Decision a Dispute in which that other is concerned.
71. We have as Men individually our Interests,
72. Connections and Ambitions, so as to Slates. Shall
73. we suffer them so situated to mingle in the federal
74. Ade. for their Interests. Virtue. Vice.
75. I. Different Objects. Different
	
The Objects. 1. Adml.
76. Judicatures	 2. Crimes of a certain Grade.
77. 2. Situation of the state Tribunals 3. Revenue.
78. The first conceded. but why. cannot the State
79. Tribunals decide upon Mari Causes subject to an
80. Appeal as well as upon others.
81.
82. 2. As to Crimes. It is an Axiom. That every Count
83. ought to retain in its own Hands the means of
84. Self-Preservation. if Offences be committed ag! the
85. Union, will you put it in the Power of state Judges
86. to decide thereupon. to acquit or to condemn. I
87. hope not. You put your Life in their Hands. You
88. present them with a Sword to destroy yourself.
89. Suppose New Jersy was to make such a Reg! of
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90. Virginia.
91. No appeal.
92. 3. As to the Revenue. do not give up the
93. Power of collecting your own Revenues. How is to be
94. done. You will collect Nothing. The state Officers
95. will feel it their Interest to consult the Temper of
96. the People of the State in which they live rather
97. than of the Union.
98. There must therefore be Dis! judges of
99. more extent of Jurisd° than maritime Causes.
100. 4. To become one People. We must. have one
101. common national Tribunal. Hence Uniformity of
102. Decision. hence a hand of Union. we shall
103. approximate to each other gradually. be  assimilated
104. in Manners, in Laws, in Customs.
105. Circuit Courts State Trib! keep up local Prejudices, etc.
106. Mistaken Notions of them. Not in the Nature of Nisi Prius.
107. They are Courts of original Jurisd? You carry Law
108. to their Homes. Courts to their Doors. meet every
109. Citizen in his own State. not many appeals. if Q? is
110. intricate, ad! till next Term & take the Op? of the
111. judges
112. Appeals from the State Tribunals. Monstrous. you will
113. make it expensive and oppressive.
114. Circuit Courts cannot prevade a Country so extensive as this.
115. Silent Operation of Laws. The Laws should be more wisely
116. framed, judiciously expounded, and promptly executed
117. in Republics than in Monarchies.
118..	 England. Scotland.





These notes were written from and back on two roughly legal sized sheets of paper.
The original manuscript is in the Rutgers University Library at New Brunswick.'"" A
comparison of the notes with Maclay's Diary'"`' indicates that they are notes of the Senate
debates taken from June 23, 1789 through June 30, 1789. The following seven points
appear in exactly the same order in both sources:
MACLAY'S DIARY
	 PATERSON'S NOTES
I. June 23: Maclay notes the
	 1.	 "Too few, if Circuit Courts.
following speech that he gave	 too great, if no Circuit
that day — "If the bill stood	 Courts."
in its present form and the
Circuit Courts were continued,
six [Supreme Court] judges
appeared to be too few. If the
Circuit Courts were struck out,
they were too many."
2. June 23: A continuation of
Maclay's speech, "The mass of
causes would remain with the
State judges."
3. June 24: "The first debate
that arose was whether there
should he Circuit Courts, or
courts of nisi prius."
4. June 29: "We got on to the
clause where a defendant was
required, on oath, to disclose
his or her knowledge in the
cause, etc." (emphasis original)
5. June 29: "Ellsworth moved
an amendment that the plaintiff,
too, should swear at the request
of the defendant."
6. June 30: "Up rose Ellsworth
and threw the common law back
all the way to the wager of
law."
2.	 "The State Courts will take up
the. great Mass of Business."
3. [roughly a page of the notes
are devoted to the relative
merits of Circuit Courts
and nisi pi-ills courts]
4. "May compell a Man to disclose
on oath ...."
5. "Motion, that Clause be amended
by swearing the Pltf."
6. "The Law. Wager."
'" Paterson Papers, file 4, Rutgers University Library. The New York Public Library's Bancroft
Collection includes a transcript of the notes. 300 Bancroft Collection 495-511.
1 " See supra note 36.
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7. June 30: "Strong went back to	 7.	 "Trial by Battle."
the ancient trial by battle."
In particular, note the similarity of phrasing between Maclay's Diary and Paterson's
Notes in numbers I and 2. Finally, Ellsworth's motion in number 5 seems conclusive.
The Notes follow:
[Begin first page of manuscript notes. Supreme Court debate of June 23) 91
I.	 The Number of Judges not
2. Sufficient. Life, Liberty, and
3. Property. House of Lords in England.
4. Sessions in Scotland 13 or 15.
5. No Appeal from them.
6. - Too few, if Circuit Courts. too
7. great, if no Circuit Courts.
8. - The Powers of the S. Court are
9. great. they are to check the
10. Excess of Legislation.
11. The State courts will take
12. up the great Mass of Business.
13. Difficult to get Judges enough
14. Numbers no Security ag! Corruption.
[Circuit Courts debate of June 24 through June 27.m]
15. Saving of Expenses in Nisi Prius
16. Courts. as to	 [witnesses?'
17. Arguments more Solemn when
18. at Bar.
19. Difficult for parties to attend
20. at the Sup. Court.
21. Extent of the Country. Great
22. Labour & Expenses.
23. Counsel. two sets of them.
24. New Trials.
25. Gaol Delivery. Jury of
26. Assizes to ascertain the
27. Fact.
28. Equity Cases should be
29. referred to Chy. they should
30. not be blended. Ld. Mansfield.
31. Equitizing. keep them
32. distinct.
33. Hab. Corpus & Sovereignty
190 See MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 85.
191 A general reading of Maclay's Diary indicates that the Senate considered the bill section by
section, beginning with the the first section. The notes in lines 15-82 partially cover the period
between June 23 when the nisi prius debate began and June 29 when the procedure debate began.
MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 36, at 86,89-91. Congress was not in session on June 28, a Sunday.
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34. of the State.
35. Germany like America.
36. Russians & Peter the Great.
37. People in Extremity bold,
38,	 interprising, etc not cringing
39. and courting Offices as about
40. the Court. Must have
41. Nisi Prius Courts, & not Circuits.
42. Must trust a great Deal
43. to State courts.
44. Advantages of Nisi Prius
45. 1. Uniformity of Decision.
46. 2. Maturity of Judgment.
47. Comm'.' swift, easy, and direct
48. None. except as to a new trial.
49. Exton. [Ex continenti?] Affidavits.
50. cases.
[Begin second page of manuscript notes.]
51. Nisi Prius
52. Why should not the
53. juriscr of the Dist'. Court be
54. complete & extend to all
55. Cases at Law and in Equity,
56. with an Appeal, limiting
57. the same.
58. If a small Sum, it
59. may involve a Question of Law
60. of great Importance, and
61. should be liable to be removed.
62. Hambden, his a Cause of 20 si.
63. - Sun ► of 500 D r. small enough.
64. General Intercourse.
65. No Complaint as to the Adm?
66. of justice. 2 Shenfiv.
67. Def t. but how as to the Pltf.
68. Concurrent juriscr.
69. Pervade the Union.
70,	 More Satisr to the Parties.
71. The Farmers in the New England
72. States not worth more than
73. 1,000	 on an Average.
74. Money. Merchandize. Land
75. bought and sold.
76. Suppose 2 District Courts in
77. a large Dist`..
78. Where Titles are held under
79. different States, each State
80. will endeavor to protect its
81. own Grant. they should be
82. tried in the federal Court.
September 1985]	 FIRST CONGRESS'S UNDERSTANDING 	 1139
[Begin June 29 debate over procedure in the lower courts.' 92 ]
83. May compel a Man to
84. disclose on Oath in one Side of
85. the Court & not on the other.
86. Strange.
87. No Ground for the Distinction
88. More within the Reach of
89. Juries. Juries can judge
90. of Evidence.
91. uncertain. Too common.
92. better a particular Mischief
93. than a general Inconvenience
94. Judges cannot infer a
95. Fact from a Fact.
96. A Witness may testify
97. ag! his Interest.
98. May in Corn. Law Courts
99. admit a Party's Oath by
100. Consent
101. Cannot compell a man to disclose
102. a Fraud. A Factor
[Begin third page of manuscript notes.]
103. Here the Court possesses the same
104. Jurisd". both Law and Equity.
105. Cheaper swearing in one
106. Court than the other.
107. An interested Person may
108. swear in his own Behalf.
109. Less Delay, & Less Expense in
110. taking the Evidence at Corn. Law,
111. than in Equity.
112. Equity has swallowed up
113. the Com. Law Courts.
114. In Delaware they have
115. double Juriscr.' much Confusion.
116. House of Lords take up Appeals
117. from Equity.
118. Motion, that Clause be
119. amended by swearing the
120. Pltf.
[Procedure debate continues on June 30.' 9 ']
121. 1. The same Judges here exercise
122. both. This perhaps an Imperf"
192 See id. at 89-91.
199 See id, at 91 -92. Lines 121-44 appear as a seperate column on the third page of the
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123. impracticable.
124. 2. Eq. has swallowed up the
125. Corn. Law. overleaped her
126. Bounds. How as to the Corn.
127. Law Courts. Too straightlaced.
128. 3. Whether viva voce Testimony
129. preferable to written, not
130. the Question. No Interr&:
131. No Ex? before the Judge or Ex?
132. The Answer. Too sh.
133. 4. Why not swear in one
134. court as well as in the other.
135. Cheaper in one than the
136. other. Make Oaths cheap.
137. An interested Person may
138. swear at Corn. Law.
139. Both Pltf and Der. ought
140. to swear.
141. Novel Idea. - is -
142. The Remedy is not reciprocal
143. at Com. Law. it should be
144. mutual. both swear.
[Begin fourth page of manuscript notes.]
145. Mode of Proof the same in
146. the Bill in both Courts.
147. Provide for Mortgages; and then
148. Equity will have nothing to do.
149	 Why have not the Corn. Law Courts
150. in England this Power. Parliament
151. sits frequently. it is improper.
152. If the Judges thought with Blackstone,
153. a Bill would have been brought
154. forward.
155. A Witness interested may be
156. sworn.
157. The Parties by Mutual
158. Consent may swear.
159. The Law. Wager. simple
160. Contract Debt. but not
161. tried by a Jury.
162. Aw Auditors. the Parties
163. there swear before the Auditors.
164. Lord Mansfield's Decisions generally
165. followed.
166. Trial by Battle
manuscript, and may be part of the June 29 debate that led to Ellsworth's motion (see MACLAY'S
DIARY, supra note 36, at 91), in lines 118-20.
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167. It will narrow the Court of
168. Equity.
169. To try the Credibility of
170. WTo try a Question of Law.
171. Very tedious. very expensive
172. and then an Arb': advised.
